No to the Chemical Arms Treaty

By James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger,
And Donald Rumsfeld
Washington Post, 05 March 1997

The phrase “damning with faint
praise” is given new meaning by the
op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch
on the Chemical Weapons Convention
[“End the Chemical Weapons
Business,” Feb. 11]. In it, the
authors concede virtually every criticism
made by those who oppose this
controversial treaty in its present form.

They acknowledge the legitimacy of
key concerns about the Convention: its
essential unverifiability; its lack of
global coverage; the prospect that it
will inhibit non-lethal use of chemicals,
including tear gas; and its mandating the
transfer of militarily relevant chemical
offensive and defensive technology to
untrustworthy countries that become
parties. It is our view that these
problems are inherent in the present
treaty.

Take, for example, Scowcroft and
Deutch’s warning against cutting
investment in chemical defensive
measures. Unfortunately, treaties such as
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) —
which promise to reduce the menace posed
by weapons of mass destruction but which
cannot do so — inevitably tend to
diminish the perceived need and therefore
the support for defenses against such
threats.

In fact, in December 1995, the
then-vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommended a reduction of more
than $ 800 million in investment on
chemical defenses in anticipation of the
Convention’s coming into force. If past
experience is a guide, there might also
be a reduction in the priority accorded
to monitoring emerging chemical weapons
threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and
Deutch’s call for improvements in our
ability to track chemical weapons
developments.

Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn
that the “CWC [must] not [be]
exploited to facilitate the diffusion of
CWC-specific technology, equipment and
material — even to signatory
states.” The trouble is that the
Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly
obligates member states to facilitate
such transfers, even though these items
are readily exploitable for military
purposes. What is more, the treaty
commits member states not to observe any
agreements, whether multilateral or
unilateral, that would restrict these
transfers.

In short, we believe that the
problems with the Chemical Weapons
Convention in these and other areas that
have been identified by Brent Scowcroft
and John Deutch clearly demonstrate that
this treaty would be contrary to U.S.
security interests. Moreover, in our view
these serious problems undercut the
argument that the CWC’s “imperfect
constraints” are better than no
constraints at all.

The CWC would likely have the effect
of leaving the United States and its
allies more, not less, vulnerable to
chemical attack. It could well serve to
increase, not reduce, the spread of
chemical weapons manufacturing
capabilities. Thus we would be better off
not to be party to it.

Notably, if the United States is not
a CWC member state, the danger is
lessened that American intelligence about
ongoing foreign chemical weapons programs
will be dumbed down or otherwise
compromised. This has happened in the
past when enforcement of a violated
agreement was held to be a greater threat
to an arms control regime than was
noncompliance by another party. The
United States and the international
community have been unwilling to enforce
the far more easily verified 1925 Geneva
Convention banning the use of chemical
weapons — even in the face of repeated
and well-documented violations by Saddam
Hussein. What likelihood is there that we
would be any more insistent when it comes
to far less verifiable bans on production
and stockpiling of such weapons?

As a non-party, the United States
would also remain free to oppose
dangerous ideas such as providing
state-of-the-art chemical manufacturing
facilities and defensive equipment to
international pariahs such as Iran and
Cuba. And the United States would be less
likely to reduce investment in chemical
protective capabilities, out of a false
sense of security arising from
participation in the CWC.

In addition, if the United States is
not a CWC party, American taxpayers will
not be asked to bear the substantial
annual costs of our participating in a
multilateral regime that will not
“end the chemical weapons
business” in countries of concern.
(By some estimates, these costs could be
over $ 200 million per year.) Similarly,
U.S. citizens and companies will be
spared the burdens associated with
reporting and inspection arrangements
that might involve unreasonable searches
and seizures, could jeopardize
confidential business information and yet
could not ensure that other nations —
and especially rogue states — no longer
have chemical weapons programs.

Against these advantages of
nonparticipation, the purported
down-sides seem relatively
inconsequential. First, whether Russia
actually eliminates its immense chemical
arsenal is unlikely to hinge upon our
participating in the CWC. Indeed, Moscow
is now actively creating new chemical
agents that would circumvent and
effectively defeat the treaty’s
constraints.

Second, the preponderance of trade in
chemicals would be unaffected by the
CWC’s limitations, making the impact of
remaining outside the treaty regime, if
any, fairly modest on American
manufacturers.

Finally, if the United States
declines to join the present Chemical
Weapons Convention, it is academic
whether implementing arrangements are
drawn up by others or not. In the event
the United States does decide to become a
party at a later date — perhaps after
improvements are made to enhance the
treaty’s effectiveness — it is hard to
believe that its preferences regarding
implementing arrangements would not be
given considerable weight. This is
particularly true since the United States
would then be asked to bear 25 percent of
the implementing organization’s budget.

There is no way to “end the
chemical weapons business” by fiat.
The price of attempting to do so with the
present treaty is unacceptably high, and
the cost of the illusion it creates might
be higher still.

James Schlesinger was secretary of
defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford,
Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger
held the same post under Presidents Ford
and Reagan, respectively.