On 1-Year Anniversary of JCPOA, Iranian Nuclear Deal Faces Criticism

On July 14th, 2015, the United States agreed to one of the most impactful nuclear deals in its history. The Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) was a complex plan that allowed Iran access to nuclear research and some kinds of nuclear energy and enrichment processes. At its outset, the plan was critically acclaimed by President Barrack Obama and members of his administration. Despite this appraisal, the JCPOA faced heavy criticism from Congressional officials and the public. Regardless, the deal was approved by President Obama and his staff one year ago, today.

Since the signing of the deal, Iran has continued to engaged in behaviors, that some would consider aggressive and contrarian toward the spirit of the agreement. Former intelligence official and vice-president of the Center for Security Policy, Fred Fleitz, addressed some of these activities in a presentation on his recently published book Obamabomb: The Fraudulent Nuclear Deal With Iran. 

Fleitz outlines his security and legal concerns surrounding the JCPOA. Among them are the ability for Iran to maintain its heavy-water reactor, secret side deals with Iran which the Administration supported without informing the U.S. Congress in direct contravention of the Corker-Cardin amendment, the lack of an IAEA oversight of access to Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles programs (also known as  Possible Military Dimensions), and the access that Iran has received to the U.S. financial system as a benefit of the deal, despite being a known sponsor of terrorism. Fleitz discussed all of these issues at a recent Capitol Hill briefing.

With his experience in the CIA, DIA, and House Intelligence Committee, Fleitz described the deal as both dangerous and fraudulent, and began his discussion by noting that the Iran agreement was approved despite less than a quarter of the American public supporting it. Fleitz then described how the U.S. was forced to provide overwhelming concessions to Iran in order to strike a deal. These concessions included removing the heavy water reactor from the sites the JCPOA could inspect, disallowing United States sanctions against Iran to be implemented while the deal was in place, including sanctions regarding human rights violations, and the removal of IAEA inspection into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s past behavior.

Ultimately, Fleitz noted the danger of these concessions were only magnified in light of recent international findings and events. In January, 2016, Iran captured and imprisoned several US midshipmen who were moving through Iranian waters. They were intensely interrogated and detained for several days until a 1.7 billion dollar payment was made to allow their release. Second to this issue were German intelligence reports that described clandestine efforts of Iranian spies to acquire nuclear technology from German companies in 2015. With such aggressive behavior and reports following the nuclear deal, it is clear that Iran is not adhering to even the modest requirements the deal was intended to impose.

Fleitz argues that with these activities illustrate that Iran does not appear to be thwarted or deterred from hostility despite the deal. In fact, he argues that the JCPOA has emboldened Iran to become more aggressive and hostile.

On this anniversary of the Iran nuclear deal, its doubtful that its proponents expected the deal’s critics would be able to continue to muster such intense criticism, no doubt a factor of Iran’s continued and similarly unexpected belligerence. But, Fleitz and other deal critics are not merely engaged in a “We told you so” victory lap, rather, they are continuing to express deep concern for the consequences the deal will impose on future presidents and bipartisan political cooperation with regard to U.S. national security. If one year with an Iranian nuclear agreement has provided any lesson, it is that any U.S. enemy, sponsor of state terror, and violator of human rights can be dealt with diplomatically. The question is not whether deals can be struck, but rather whether they should be, and at what cost.