RESTORATION WATCH #6: WITH ‘PARTNERS’ LIKE THESE, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES?

(Washington, D.C.): Given President Clinton’s
earnestness in dismantling what he calls outdated
“Cold War” institutions, one might be forgiven
for expecting that his Administration would eschew one of
the most discredited and obsolete of all institutions —
the bilateral summit meeting with the leader of the
Kremlin. After all, such meetings reinforce the
undesirable impression that there remain two, co-equal
superpowers; that the United States regards Moscow as
having power and status justifying privileged treatment;
and that both of these states are entitled to dictate
terms within respective spheres of influence.

These condominiums were odious during the
“Twilight Struggle’s” periods of detente.
Today, they distort global political and strategic
realities and insult all those the Soviets formerly
dominated — and those their successors may hope to
dominate anew.

The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, appears to be
setting the stage for a classic Cold War-style summit
extravaganza for Boris Yeltsin when he visits Washington
in late September. Mr. Clinton’s handlers and spinmeisters
evidently hope that the photo opportunities, the signing
ceremonies,⁽¹⁾
the pomp and circumstance that are central to such
affairs will lend a patina of competence and stature to
his otherwise hapless performance on foreign policy.

‘Whistling Past the Graveyard’

To do so, however, the Administration will
have to redouble its efforts to ignore indications href=”#N_2_”>⁽²⁾ that this is
no time to be encouraging Russian yearnings to recover
its lost superpower position and/or empire. The
latest evidence supporting this judgment was published in
the attached op.ed.
article by Adrian Karatnycky in today’s New York
Times. Entitled “Russia’s Nuclear Grasp,”
this article expresses concern about a draft security
treaty providing for a Russian nuclear umbrella to be
extended over the so-called “Commonwealth of
Independent States” (i.e., the nations that emerged
from the ashes of the former Soviet Union). According to
Mr. Karatnycky:

“The draft security treaty…calls for the
eventual creation of joint armed forces, collective
peacekeeping forces and a joint air defense system.
In short, it seeks to restore a cohesive, coordinated
military force under unified control and under
Russia’s nuclear protection — a defense
arrangement resembling that of the Soviet Union.”
(Emphasis added.)

Mr. Karatnycky notes this treaty amounts to a
“military alliance that mocks President Clinton’s
Partnership for Peace, doing precisely what that proposal
was designed to avoid: creating new Eastern and Western
blocs.” Against the backdrop of ascendent hardline,
reactionary forces within Russia’s polity and the
increasing likelihood of serious challenges to the
Yeltsin presidency, this development should be viewed by
the United States with genuine alarm.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy strongly concurs with
Mr. Karatnycky’s conclusion:

“While diligently responding to problems
arising from Soviet disintegration — including the
illicit sale of nuclear fuel — the West has so far
failed to develop strategies to deal with the threat
of post-Soviet integration. At this delicate moment,
a miscalculation could mean acquiescence to a new
post-Cold War rivalry. And if reformers fail in
Russia, a new East-West divide could prove as
damaging to the interests of democracy and prosperity
in the region as the decisions made half a century
ago by the Allies in Yalta.”

President Clinton must resist the temptation (whether
motivated by narrow domestic considerations or by myopic
attachment, come what may, to Boris Yeltsin) to ignore
the implications of the Kremlin’s new military treaty. Were
Washington to host a Cold War-style, superhyped summit
despite this and related developments in the former
Soviet Union, Moscow will reasonably conclude that the
United States is indeed acquiescencing to Russia’s
reversion to form — with all the attendant consequences
of which Mr. Karatnycky warns.

The Center for Security Policy notes with particular
concern Russian suggestions that Ukraine is returning to
Moscow’s orbit as part of a new “special” or
“strategic” relationship. The Center has long
believed that it to be of the utmost importance to
encourage and consolidate the independence and
pro-Western orientation of Ukraine, including by
permitting it to retain a nuclear deterrent to possible
Russian revanchism.⁽³⁾
If Kiev decides, however, to resubmit to
Moscow’s imperial dictates and reintegrate its military
forces into a Soviet-style structure, the United States
has no choice but to insist that Ukraine live up to its
formal commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its
territory.

– 30 –

1. For example, as noted in a
recent Center for Security Policy Decision Brief
entitled More Steps on the Slippery Slope
Toward Terminating U.S. Theater Missile Defense Options,
(No. 94- D 87, 25 August 1994),
the Administration seems intent on having Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin sign in Washington a new agreement
that would effectively foreclose American options for
effective defenses against shorter-range ballistic
missiles.

2. For further discussion of such
indications, see the previous five Center Decision
Briefs in this Restoration Watch
series: #1: The Kremlin Reverts to Form
(No. 94-D 35, 15 April 1994); #2:
Russia’s Organized Crime ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-D_39″>No. 94-D 39, 21 April 1994); #3:
To Rebuild an Empire, First Get an Emperor
(No. 94-D 49, 12 May 1994);
#4: A Russian Weimar Republic is an Unworthy Partner,
Unreliable Ally (No.
94-D 70, 8 July 1994); #5: Results of
Coup Trial Belie Yeltsin Assurances That All is Well
(No. 94-D 88, 26 August 1994).

3. See, for example, the Center’s Decision
Brief entitled Russian Parliament’s Grab
for Sevastopol Demands Immediate Shift in U.S. Stance on
Ukrainian Nukes, ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=93-D_59″>No. 93-D 59, 9 July 1993).