Russia Ex Machina

(Washington, D.C.): In ancient Greece, playwrights sometimes resorted to the theatrical
device
of lowering a god to the stage to resolve an otherwise insoluble plot. At this writing, it appears
that NATO desperately hopes to draw upon this southeastern European dramatic tradition. It
seeks to cast Russia in a similar deus ex machina role for the purpose of extricating
the Atlantic
Alliance from the present debacle in Kosovo. No one should be under any illusion, however: The
West will pay a high price for such a Russian “solution” — and pay and pay and pay.

No Good Options

The growing interest in inviting Russia, evident in comments by the Clinton Administration,
allied
governments and some Republican legislators, is only partly a function of a recognition that there
currently appear to be no good options available for terminating the conflict with Serbia’s
Slobodan Milosevic. The costs of NATO’s bombing campaign continue to rise without
appreciably slowing the Serbian destruction of Kosovo or fostering opposition to Milosevic’s
regime in Belgrade. Enthusiasm for an even more expensive ground campaign (never widespread
among people who actually understood what would be involved) appears to be waning.

And the idea of America again cutting-and-running — “declaring victory and going home” —
without at least some sort of face-saving agreement seems, for the moment at least, a non-starter.
If Russia can help broker such a deal, the reasoning goes, this would be the least bad option.

Dangerous Misconceptions

This reasoning is predicated upon a few misconceptions, however.

Russia’s Interests

First, there is the idea that Russia shares the West’s interest in a just
solution. A prime
example of this illusion was UN Secretary General Kofi Annan‘s laughable
statement yesterday
that he was going to Moscow to promote a new diplomatic initiative since: “The Russian
government has been very active [on Kosovo] and has been playing a constructive role and I hope
to be able to pursue this further with them.”

In fact, Russia has been providing such aid and comfort to the Milosevic regime as its limited
financial resources and diminished political muscle allow. Russia’s efforts to date include:
providing “volunteers” (one of whom was reportedly wearing a Yugoslav army officer’s uniform
when he was captured by a KLA unit last weekend) and shipments of materiel intended to support
the Yugoslav war effort; the calling up over the past two weeks of nearly 169,000 Russian men
between the ages of 18 and 27; and bellicose Kremlin pronouncements about “retargeting”
nuclear weapons at NATO countries and preventing the West from establishing control over
Yugoslavia.

The latest invidious maneuver by former-KGB-operative-turned-premier Yevgeny
Primakov
involves the appointment of his predecessor, Victor Chernomyrdin, as a special
envoy for
Yugoslavia. Thanks to the latter’s close relationship with Vice President Al Gore — forged during
years of backroom sweetheart deal-making in the so-called Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission —
the Communist-apparatchik-turned-oligarch will doubtless be seen as a man the West can do
business with on Kosovo.

What Russia Wants

The nature of the business that might be done is the subject of the second
misconception,
namely, that the Russians are reliable partners in seeking to establish conditions that will
lead to a genuine and durable peace in the Balkans. In fact, the Primakovs of Russia see
the
world as what political scientists call a “zero-sum” game: A Western success in Kosovo will be a
loss for the Kremlin and its ally, Milosevic. Conversely, if NATO — which recently humiliated
Moscow by ignoring its objections to the alliance’s eastward expansion — is now itself humiliated,
the Russian leadership can win points at home among its nationalist-communist constituency and
abroad by demonstrating that Russia is back in the great power game.

If the Russians are going to help pull NATO’s chestnuts out of the Kosovo fire, it is a safe bet
that the continuation of the Milosevic regime will be one of their non-negotiable demands. As it
happens, the Clinton Administration and fellow left-wing governments in allied capitals have made
no secret of their desire to do another deal with the Serbian dictator. Accordingly, they have
steadfastly refused to make the end of the regime in Belgrade an explicit war aim, let alone
seeking the Serbian dictator’s indictment for innumerable crimes against humanity.

What Russia Will Exact

This proposition, in turn, bears on the third misconception: There will be
little, if any
cost, to NATO governments incurred in contracting out to Russia the task of undoing the
Kosovo fiasco. In addition to the incalculable price in terms of the West’s moral
authority and
integrity associated with an outcome that once again legitimates Milosevic and spares him
prosecution, the Kremlin will surely insist on other, expensive forms of compensation.

These will probably include: still further sluicing of IMF and other multilateral organizations’
funds into the Swiss bank accounts of the Russian elite and other corrupt entities; perhaps
expanded access for Russia to sensitive Western technology and an end to the few U.S.-imposed
sanctions against Russian companies determined to have engaged in dangerous proliferation
activities; and a commitment to cede Russia a greater say over NATO operations in the future (an
arrangement actually contemplated in the so-called “Founding Act” forged two years ago as a
basis for relations between the alliance and its Cold War adversary).

The highest cost of all arising from a decision to embrace a Russia ex machina in
Kosovo is
particularly ironic, coming as it does on the eve of a three-day celebration of NATO’s fifty-year
struggle to fight and win the struggle against Soviet imperialism. If as expected, the allies accede
to the demand by Moscow and Belgrade that Russian troops — and perhaps even Russian
commanders — be included in any international (not to be confused with NATO) peacekeeping
operation in Kosovo, the alliance will for the first time be in position where it is explicitly
endorsing the Kremlin’s occupation of parts of Eastern Europe!

The Bottom Line

Thanks to the Clinton Administration’s failure to stop Milosevic long ago, its lack of advance
planning for the present operation and its refusal to articulate defensible war aims, the United
States and its allies have no good near-term options for resolving the Kosovo crisis. Despite the
seductiveness of a Russia ex machina, however, the worst option of all
would be to count on
the likes of Yevgeny Primakov to come up with a solution that promotes and protects
Western interests.