‘See No Evil’: China’s Proliferation Continues Apace; Clinton Dissembles/Ignores This Reality, Seeks to Reward the PRC

(Washington, D.C.): In
riveting testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11
June, a former top intelligence official said the unsayable, confirming long-standing suspicions:

The Clinton Administration is determined to ignore China’s ongoing involvement in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the ballistic and cruise missiles
with which such weapons could be delivered. Worse yet, it is prepared to
misrepresent or
withhold evidence that conflicts with its assertions that the PRC has ceased such activities.
Even so, that evidence continues to accumulate — and should be made the subject of
intensive congressional investigations.

This problem is only likely to grow worse if President Clinton uses his upcoming trip to China
further to dissemble that China no longer warrants the dubious distinction of being “the principal
supplier of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to the world” href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾ — to say nothing
of actually rewarding it for making additional, empty promises about refraining from
such
activities in the future.

The Oehler Revelations

In response to questions from Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS), Chairman
of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee’s Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee,
Gordon
Oehler — who was, until recently a Special Assistant to the Director of Central
Intelligence and
head of the CIA’s Non-proliferation Center — testified about the politicization of intelligence
products by the Clinton Administration in connection with Chinese proliferation activities in
Pakistan. As Dr. Oehler put it:

“The senior intelligence officials knew why the Administration took the position that
they did — [namely,] that the imposition of…Category I sanctions would have a very
great impact on its relationship with China, and [so] almost any measure needed to be
found to continue their negotiating flexibility, rather than automatically impose
sanctions. And one of the easier outs on this is to say that the intelligence
information doesn’t quite meet their high standards.

“I must say that the intelligence analysts in the Community were very
concerned about this. These are the people who struggle day-to-day to put
together the intelligence judgments, a collection of profiles, and everything. And,
they were very discouraged to see that fairly regularly, their work was, in
their view, summarily dismissed by the policy community, with a statement
that ‘It isn’t good enough, it isn’t good enough.‘

“With that in mind, [the Administration’s policy-makers] are going to try to find
whatever way they can to carry out the policy that they think is best. And one of
the loopholes in this, is that the President must certify that this transfer has taken
place. The certification has been passed down to an Under Secretary of State.
But then it’s up to that person to decide whether the level of evidence is sufficient
to impose these — [what are], in their view drastic or draconian, sanctions.
Because of their interest in wanting to preserve their negotiating flexibility…there
was going to be little likelihood that the evidence would ever be high enough
to do that.“

Business As Usual

Dr. Oehler’s testimony stressed the extent to which the blind eye turned by the U.S.
government
toward China’s proliferation activities has had undesirable repercussions. He noted that
“Pakistan could not have tested a nuclear device a few weeks ago without the nuclear
materials and technologies supplied by China.” As the Center for Security Policy —
among
others — has noted,⁽²⁾ the perception that the United States
was tolerating various Chinese efforts
to “encircle” India contributed directly to the latest nuclear developments in South Asia.

The former intelligence officer testified, moreover, that China’s proliferation
activities
continue — Clinton Administration assertions to the contrary
notwithstanding. According to
Dr. Oehler, “Exports of [WMD-related] materials and technologies with concern to
Pakistan
and Iran have not abated, and some exports to other countries have continued, as well.”

In fact, in the 16 June editions of the Washington Times national security
correspondent Bill
Gertz reported:

“Iran held discussions with China last month on the purchase of
‘telemetry equipment’
for missile testing, said U.S. officials familiar with intelligence reports. href=”#N_3_”>⁽³⁾ In addition,
new intelligence data indicates Chinese technicians involved in missile research and
development are working with Libya to help the North African state develop
missiles.”

Watch This Space

In light of these revelations, congressional investigators must redouble their efforts to
ascertain
the true nature of the PRC’s involvement in proliferation activities — both China’s efforts to
secure relevant technology from the United States⁽⁴⁾
and its transfers of deadly equipment and
know-how to others. In the latter connection, the following areas deserve attention:

• Is China involved in reverse engineering U.S. Stinger missiles and selling
  such advanced
  shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missiles to state-sponsors of terrorism and others who may use
  such weapons to shoot down civil airliners or other planes?
• Is there reason to believe that negotiations are underway between China and Russia — or
  entities of the two countries — for the sale of Russian special nuclear materials,
  with the
  expectation that China would make these ingredients for nuclear weapons it available to
  others?
• Is China involved in the sale of semiconductor manufacturing technology of American origin
  with direct relevance to weapons applications to Iran?
• Is China selling a wind-tunnel suitable for developing missiles and/or other
  aerospace
  systems to Libya? Is China providing technical training in relevant areas to Libyan
  students?
• Could the anti-tank missile components whose transfer by China to Pakistan’s nuclear
  research
  institute is reportedly being closely monitored by U.S. intelligence be used as a cover for
  further shipments of weapons of mass destruction-relevant equipment? Would it be
  possible to discern the actual nature of such transactions?

The Bottom Line

If the answer to these and similar questions is in the affirmative, the Clinton Administration
would
have even less basis for its claims that China has changed its ways and given up the malevolent —
but highly profitable (in both financial and strategic terms) — business of selling weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology. Given the stakes, Congress must get the facts,
not the
“fudge” that President Clinton has acknowledged serving up when the truth proves
inconvenient to his policies.⁽⁵⁾

Under no circumstances can the President be allowed to extend further “rewards” or “carrots”
(e.g., access to still more sensitive dual-use technologies, sophisticated satellites or militarily
relevant hardware) to China on the grounds that Beijing has earned them — whether by dint of its
phony restraint with respect to proliferation or by virtue of its offer of yet another set of empty
promises of future cooperation in this area.

– 30 –

1. A finding contained in the Director of Central Intelligence’s Report
to Congress entitled, The
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions (June 1997) as cited in The Proliferation Primer, a
majority report of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation
and Federal Services (January 1998). This important study can be obtained
via the Subcommittee’s Web site (2. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
India’s Nuclear Tests Show Folly of Clinton’s CTB
(No. 98-D 86, 19 May 1998).

3. Mr. Gertz revealed that: “The Iran-China sales negotiations were
circulated in a May 27
intelligence report sent to a few senior Clinton administration officials. The report is
fresh
evidence that China — in addition to Russia — is playing a key role in Iran’s drive to build
two medium-range ballistic missile systems.“

4. A particularly troubling development on this front has been the
recent disclosure that Beijing is
trying to coerce U.S. nuclear power companies into committing to transfer advanced reactor
technology as the price of admission for the PRC’s ostensibly lucrative reactor construction
program. In fact, the idea of having U.S. companies assisting China’s nuclear program —
which
was made possible by President Clinton’s fraudulent certification of Chinese good behavior on
proliferation — was a dubious one, even in the absence such a demand. (See
Clinton Watch #
21: Efforts to Help Chinese Missile Program Reek of Corruption, Betrayal of U.S.
Interests
[No. 98-D 61, 6 April 1998].) The fact that it has been imposed,
together with a requirement that
the companies involved make an explicit commitment to join the “China Lobby” (i.e., businesses
that can be relied upon to use their corporate resources and influence to protect the PRC from
U.S. retaliation for unacceptable trade, economic or geostrategic activities), makes this bilateral
initiative doubly ill-advised.

5. See Clinton Watch # 23: Confession of a
Politicizer (No. 98-D 72, 28 April 1998).