Sharon Says ‘No’ to the Golan’s Surrender

(Washington, D.C.): The U.S.-brokered, high-level negotiations between Israel
and Syria
resuming today in Sheperdstown, West Virginia come against the backdrop of growing evidence
that this “process” is no more likely to produce a genuine and durable peace than has the
so-called Palestinian “track.” For one thing, Hafez Assad appears increasingly unlikely to live
long
enough to implement any agreement he signs — even if, against all odds, he were inclined to do
so. His health has failed to the point where he is now reportedly working only two hours a day
and concentrating most of his energies on the dubious proposition of securing the succession of
his son, Bashar.

For another, the Palestinians in Lebanon are making known their view that Israel will know
no
peace until all those who wish to “return” to their homes in “Palestine” are permitted by Israel to
do so — a demographic and political show-stopper for the Jewish State. Then there is the
problem that Syria’s ally, Iran, is objecting vehemently to any normalization of Syrian-Israeli
relations.

Finally, Ariel Sharon, one of Israel’s most highly decorated warriors who now serves as
Chairman of the opposition Likud Party, has made known his party’s adamant opposition to the
surrender of the Golan Heights. Prime Minister Barak is clearly determined to secure the
necessary support in the Knesset and among the Israeli people for an agreement that will turn
over to Assad the entire Golan. The compelling reasons itemized in an oped. article by Gen.
Sharon which appeared in the New York Times last week for rejecting such a deal
offer hope that
most of the people of Israel, if not a majority of their elected representatives, will come to
appreciate the mortal peril such a transaction will likely entail — and reject it.

The New York Times, 28 December 1999

Why Should Israel Reward Syria?

By Ariel Sharon

As the Israeli and Syrian teams hurry back to Washington to resume negotiations, we are told
this is the last and only chance for peace and that Israel must take it or face war. I believe this
hasty approach is wrong, misleading and, above all, dangerous.

Israel must adopt an approach that will allow it to assess Syrian intentions over time before
making any commitment to give up the commanding high ground of the Golan Heights.

And since in Israel, the only real democracy in the Middle East, we like to do things the
American way, I suggest we should also adopt the American model when negotiating the vital
issue of control of the heights. The United States ended the cold war and brought stability to
Western Europe because it understood that peace must be based on dealing effectively with the
military capabilities of former adversaries and not on changes in intentions alone.

It kept the defensive shield of NATO intact, and any alterations in Western strength were
based
on reciprocity by the Soviet Union. If this kind of concern for security was essential in Europe, it
is of critical importance in the shifting sands of the Middle East, and particularly when dealing
with Syria.

What would United States negotiators demand if the Golan Heights were an American asset?
I
believe they would stress several points.

First, there must be no rewards for the aggressor. In most conflicts negotiated in this century,
the
aggressor paid by losing territory, as Japan and Germany did after World War II. Syria attacked
Israel three times: in 1948, 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. From 1948 to 1967, it carried
on a war of attrition against Israeli civilians by attempting to divert vital water resources from
Israel.

Now Israel is asked to reward the aggressor by allowing return of the heights that rise over
its
territory in the valley below.

Knowledgeable statesmen and strategic experts have warned that, given the nondemocratic,
authoritarian character of the Syrian regime and the unpredictability of what might take place in
Syria after Hafez al-Assad is no longer in power, an Israeli agreement to return to the 1967
borders could cause Israel to end up with neither peace nor the Golan Heights.

Second, national defense requires territory. Most foreign defense experts and senior United
States Army officers who have visited the Golan or studied it repeat the categorical opinion that
even in the missile age it is impossible to defend Israel effectively against a ground attack
without military control of the Golan Heights. Syria has more than 4,000 tanks and 1,000
missiles, and the last and only line where an assault by them could be stopped runs through the
center of the heights.

The missile threat and the vulnerability of Israel’s home front do not allow Israeli military
planners to rely any longer on a 24-hour rapid reserve mobilization system. The depth and space
of the Golan can buy the time for regular forces to contain a surprise attack.

Furthermore, no country, including the United States, has ever given up territory and needed
defensive space just because it had advanced weapons systems or sophisticated early warning
technology.

Third, Syrian armed forces must be reduced. Though Israel so far has not done so, it must
insist
that if it is to give up the defensive asset of the Golan Heights, there must be not only a
demilitarized zone on the Golan, but also a reduction of Syria’s armed forces and missiles, and a
dismantling of its arsenal of chemical warfare. Israel must also demand, though it has not yet
done so, the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, where a continued Syrian military
presence would reduce Israel’s ability to defend its northern borders.

Israel has not made explicit demands, either, that the United States will not rearm Syria with
advanced Western weapons after an agreement is reached. Such rearming would erode the Israeli
ability to deter attack and cancel the Israeli qualitative edge in weaponry that the United States
has pledged to maintain.

Fourth, Israel must have control of its water resources, which are of great long-term
importance
in an arid region where there are already shortages. A third of Israel’s water flows from the
Golan Heights and could be diverted there; Israel must continue to have a presence near these
water sources.

Finally, comprehensive peace must also include measures to contain threats from Iraq and
Iran,
which have weapons of mass destruction and could also be sources of terrorist activity. This is
another important issue about which Israel has made no specific demands in the current
negotiations.

Since 1975, successive United States administrations have been committed to the principles
in
President Gerald Ford’s letter to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin backing Israel’s stance that any
peace agreement must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights.

“Even in times of peace, we must hold the Golan Heights,” Ehud Barak, then the Israeli
military
chief of staff, said in 1994. And he was not alone. Mr. Rabin took the same position in 1992,
when he was prime minister.

Today Israel is being called upon to make so-called “painful compromises.” It is asked to
give up
the Golan, transferring to foreign troops a major building block of its overall capability to defend
itself, deter attacks and assure itself of early warning if an attack should occur. It is also asked to
bear the painful cost of transferring 18,000 of its own citizens and uprooting 33 communities,
deepening already dangerous divisions in Israeli society. All this for what is at best an uncertain
nonbelligerency agreement? Thanks, but no thanks.

I believe Israel must keep the Golan Heights. Peace is important for Israel, and we all seek it.
But
it is no less important for the Syrians. Isn’t it about time that they were asked to make some
painful compromises as well?

Ariel Sharon is chairman of Israel’s Likud Party.