Time For A “Sanity Check”: Do Hasty US Concessions To Gorbachev Make Sense?

Dangerous Pressure to Do Deals with Gorbachev

In recent weeks, the Bush Administration has become increasingly assertive in its determination to do everything possible to support the Gorbachev regime:

• A raft of economic and financial concessions (e.g., waiver of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, granting observer status in the GATT, negotiations on a far-reaching trade agreement, and the disadvantageous settlement of defaulted czarist and other debts) have already been authorized or are in the works.

This is occurring despite the fact that the recently announced Soviet Five-Year Plan represents a continuation of bankrupt central planning and postpones genuine systemic reform.

 

• Various arms control concessions are being pushed through the U.S. government’s interagency process in the belief that they are essential to the completion of major agreements by the June 1990 Bush-Gorbachev summit or shortly thereafter. Secretary of State James Baker evidently intends to erode important American negotiating positions in the START and other talks in order to make "progress" during his meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in February.

 

This is occurring despite the recommendations of U.S. negotiators against preparing accords on strategic forces, conventional forces in Europe and chemical weapons under an artificial deadline and mounting evidence that the Soviet military is hardening its position in the arms talks to achieve tactical advantages under these circumstances.

 

• The Bush Administration is expressing growing unhappiness over the insistence of the Baltic republics and others within the Soviet Union bent on obtaining real political freedoms and independence. In so doing, the Administration has shown a willingness — as it did in China — to align itself in the name of "stability" with those denying such aspirations.

 

This is occurring despite growing indications that the USSR is using force in Azerbaijan in part to quell the popular movement for reform and autonomy from Moscow.

 

• A series of recent decisions by the U.S. government has resulted in the liberalization of previous limits on the sale of certain extremely sophisticated, militarily relevant technology to the Soviet Union and its allies. Most recently, the Administration decided on 19 January 1990 to exempt certain East European countries from export controls on selected items such as advanced computers, telecommunications equipment, and machine tools.

 

This is occurring despite the fact that the USSR is redoubling its efforts to acquire illegally "dual-use" technology with a view to retooling its military as well as civilian industrial bases and the fact that its East European allies continue to serve as integral elements of Moscow’s technology acquisition apparatus.

 

While the breadth and strategic import of these initiatives — and the haste with which they are being advanced — are extremely worrisome, they are not surprising since President Bush has made no secret of his determination to do "anything [he] can to help Gorbachev succeed." What is surprising, however, is that the U.S. willingness to make concessions to the Soviet leader continues apace despite the mounting evidence that Gorbachev’s tenure is becoming more problematic and uncertain with each passing day.

Unchanging Policy Despite Changing Circumstances

Only a few months ago, this generous American policy was predicated on a very different thesis. Then, most U.S. policy-makers believed that perestroika would succeed eventually. Everyone recognized that such an outcome would not be achieved right away and that it would certainly entail considerable difficulty. In the end, however, the consensus view was that Gorbachev would prevail with a reform program ostensibly aimed at transforming the USSR into a nation with Western-style political and economic institutions and a benign foreign policy.

According to this thesis, the West could, and should, facilitate such a transition through devices like: lending the Soviet Union money on generous, undisciplined terms; expanding the USSR’s access to U.S. markets; selling Moscow sophisticated technology; and enabling the Soviets to reduce their expenditures on the military sector through sweeping arms reduction agreements. Its adherents naturally felt that the more these devices were utilized — and the faster — the sooner Gorbachev would realize his objectives.

In the past few weeks, however, the premise that underpinned these concessions has been buffeted by the growing recognition inside and outside of the Bush Administration that there is little chance of perestroika succeeding. Indeed, perestroika, at least as currently configured, is dead in the water. Events from Berlin to Baku have shaken the optimists and vindicated those like Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates whose dour assessment of Gorbachev’s prospects was suppressed by Secretary Baker last October. In fact, it now appears that this pessimistic view has become the consensus position of those who influence policy, even such figures as George Kennan whose proclivity for "best-case" assessments of the USSR is well-established.

If Gorbachev’s Failure is Becoming Obvious, What Follows is Not

While official Washington is coming to realize that Mikhail Gorbachev’s modest reform program is likely doomed, there is still considerable uncertainty as to what will happen when it is finally jettisoned. Some believe he will be toppled and replaced by avowedly unfriendly communists who will lead the Soviet Union once more into adventurism at the expense of Western interests. Alternatively, Gorbachev may try to retain control by transforming himself from radical reformer into a more traditional and repressive Soviet totalitarian — a process perhaps already under way.

Whichever scenario unfolds, one would think that the new appraisal of developments in the Soviet Union would be leavening the yeasty enthusiasm in the West for cementing deals with the current ruler of the Kremlin. This would, of course, greatly underestimate the determination and the resourcefulness of those in Washington (and allied capitals) who are determined to do business with the Soviets — come what may — especially in the form of new, popularity-enhancing arms agreements.

Such officials are bravely arguing that the original policy approach continues to be fully justifiedeven if the logic that once underpinned it no longer applies. As Mr. Baker said recently on CNN: "We should lock in good agreements….While we have an opportunity to get them. It will make it a lot more difficult…for subsequent leaders…to reverse the agreements that we [have] entered into." —

Going for Broke in Arms Control

Nowhere is this proposition more in evidence than in the arms control arena. The logic is that the more agreements the United States can sign that appear to compel the USSR to cut up vast quantities of armaments, the better. A corollary premise is that such arms will be difficult, expensive and time-consuming for the Soviets to replace in the event they actually were to try to reconstitute the threat that currently exists. Unfortunately, the rationales appear at least as flawed as the previous basis for hasty arms control negotiations:

Soviet Compliance Cannot be Assumed

First, as the Soviet Union’s belated admission that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a core violation of the ABM Treaty reveals, even the Soviet regime responsible for concluding an arms control agreement cannot be relied upon fully to respect its terms. It is imprudent to expect that a successor regime would behave otherwise — particularly one that may choose to disassociate itself from the policies of a previous, and presumably discredited, government.

Don’t Count Chickens Before They’re Hatched

Second, virtually any reductions agreement will take years to implement; START, conventional forces and chemical arms agreements, for example, will stipulate that the required destructions of weapons be carried out over protracted periods. In a scenario in which Gorbachev disappears from the scene — or is transformed into a less felicitous character — the near-term effect of the agreed reductions will almost certainly be less than advertized this may permit them to be reversed more easily by Moscow.

Some may seek to minimize the significance of this problem by arguing that corresponding cuts on the U.S. side will also not have gone into effect. Unfortunately, the reality is that steps that will adversely affect American security are being taken by this country now, in part motivated by the anticipation of coming arms control agreements. Actions like American defense budget cuts and programmatic slowdowns on the one hand and vastly expanded Soviet bloc access to militarily relevant Western technology on the other are already beginning to degrade the U.S. posture vis a vis the Soviet Union.

Arms Races Are the Only Thing the Soviets Can Do Well

Finally — even if one believes the Soviets will honor their commitments to make arms cuts and that no build-up in Soviet forces will ensue until the cuts have been faithfully implemented — it is simply wrongheaded to think the United States will be advantaged should Moscow decide to resume its campaign to accrue military power. As a practical matter, the one thing the Soviets have shown their system to be relatively good at is amassing weapons.

By contrast, the United States has never been able to compete quantitatively in arms with the USSR; it is unlikely to be able to do so in the future. The U.S. industrial base is already experiencing significant contractions in the face of sustained reductions in the defense budget over the past five years. Moreover, Congressional willingness to invest the necessary sums — even if confronted by a Soviet resumption of its build-up of recent years — can hardly be assumed.

What is more, as the numbers of weapons each side can legally deploy are reduced, the incentives for the Soviets to exploit their production infrastructure to reestablish favorable "correlations of forces" will only increase. In this connection, it is worth noting that the START treaty is likely to produce warhead-to-target ratios that are more advantageous to the USSR than the pre-treaty situation. Were they to choose, following an agreement, to produce larger numbers of strategic missiles than are permitted, the Soviets could do so at relatively small cost and obtain still better attack capabilities than they enjoy at present.

"Stand-Down" on Further, Hasty Concessions to Gorbachev

What is true for the arms control arena is equally true for other areas in which U.S.-Soviet cooperation is being intensively pursued. Under present circumstances, it simply makes neither economic nor strategic sense to promote sizeable Western investments in the USSR, to facilitate Moscow’s access to untied loans (e.g., syndications and bonds) and U.S. government-guaranteed credits or to liberalize Soviet access to dual-use technology.

In both arms control negotiations and the array of economic, financial and technological initiatives now underway, the United States would be well advised to keep its powder dry. Instead of offering sweeping concessions, the United States now should: maintain an effective and qualitatively robust military posture with which Moscow finds itself unable to compete; eschew arms control deals that would compromise that posture; and deny the Soviet Union access to large-scale Western economic, financial and technology resources unless and until wholesale transformation of the Soviet system occurs.

Such a policy offers a double benefit: It properly safeguards U.S. security interests during a period of grave uncertainty about the USSR’s future course and it maintains the pressure for genuine, systemic reform there — the sort of change needed to effect a meaningful and lasting diminution in the Soviet threat.