Time for Post-Cold War Thinking About Missile Defenses

(Washington, D.C.): In an op.ed. article published in the Washington
Post on 12 December, two
zealous advocates of arms control, in general, and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, in
particular, trotted out shopworn arguments about the technical impediments to missile defense
and trumpeted the opposition to American deployments of such defenses now being heard from
some U.S. allies and potential adversaries. The essay by Frank Von Hippel and Philipp Bleek
perfectly captured the mindset of those whose intellectual attachment to strategic constructs of a
by-gone Cold War blinds them to changing policy and technological realities.

To its credit, the Post published at year’s end a rebuttal authored by Sen. Jon Kyl
(R-AZ), a man
emerging as one of the Senate’s most influential experts on military and arms control matters,
and Jeff Gedmin, Director of the New Atlantic Initiative and a Resident Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute. The Kyl-Gedmin op.ed. makes a persuasive case that “It’s time to leave the
old Cold War thinking behind and get on with the task of defending the American people and our
allies.”

Washington Post, 31 December 1999

The Case For Missile Defense

By Jeffrey Gedmin and Jon Kyl

As the debate about U.S. missile defense unfolds, it is important to remember the basics of
leadership and vision. An example of the opposite — timidity and shortsightedness — is the
recycled Cold War argument of Philipp C. Bleek and Frank N. von Hippel in their Dec. 12 op-ed
piece [“Missile Defense: A Dangerous Move”].

The writers argue that “cooperative efforts” toward international security would be “derailed
by a
U.S. decision to go it alone in pursuit of illusory defenses.” That theory, never very compelling,
is entirely unpersuasive today, when we face a burgeoning missile threat and have effective
defenses against it within our grasp.

Their argument against missile defense rests on two principal points. First, they contend,
attacks
by rogue states such as North Korea or Iran are improbable. “The desire for prestige and
bargaining leverage may motivate North Korea and Iran to acquire intercontinental ballistic
missiles,” they write. “But these missiles are unlikely vehicles for a deliberate nuclear attack —
unless a country wants to commit suicide.”

If indeed an increasing number of rogue states see missile capability as useful for blackmail
and
coercion, you might think that would be enough to spur American leaders to take steps to
diminish that leverage and clout. Moreover, missile defense is not just about protection from
“deliberate” attacks. It would be egregiously irresponsible not to defend against an equally
deadly accidental launch.

But why are Bleek and von Hippel convinced that a deliberate attack by a rogue state is so
unlikely? The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission, which released its sobering report on ballistic
missile threats in July 1998, concluded that a number of nations are working to acquire “ballistic
missiles with biological or nuclear payloads.” A rogue nation, the commission concluded, could
have the capability to strike the United States in as little as five years.

The consensus on the Rumsfeld Commission’s findings has only broadened since it came out.
The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), representing the combined judgment of all U.S.
intelligence agencies, underscores the fact. The NIE states that “the proliferation of
medium-range ballistic missiles — driven primarily by North Korean No Dong [missile] sales —
has
created an immediate, serious, and growing threat to U.S. forces, interests, and allies, and has
significantly altered the strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia.”

Still, Bleek and von Hippel argue that the missile threat is overblown. They are concerned
that
missile defense is not foolproof. An attacker, after all, could still carry out an assault with a “boat
or a civilian aircraft.” What’s more, the missiles of an adversary “would certainly be equipped
with countermeasures” so that a missile, even one launched accidentally, “could penetrate the
system.”

Of course no defense system is ever infallible. Nor is missile defense intended as a means of
dealing with the full spectrum of threats facing the United States. But this is an argument for
doing nothing. The ballistic missile threat continues to be the primary threat facing the United
States. Ballistic missiles are a cost-effective delivery system: Whether short- or long-range, they
carry a high probability of delivering their payload to a target.

In the hands of the wrong people, moreover, they become a powerful geopolitical weapon.
Would the United States and its allies have liberated Kuwait if Saddam had possessed an
intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead?

What about countermeasures? To every measure there is a countermeasure, to be sure. But
America’s strength is the immense and growing technological edge it has on its adversaries, real
and potential. We may never be perfectly invulnerable, but the right missile defense system will
considerably lower the risk of a missile’s reaching the United States.

Bleek and von Hippel cite Russian, Chinese and European objections to a missile defense.
“The
most effective protection against nuclear weapons,” they write, “is to strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation and disarmament regime.”

It’s true the Russians and Chinese object to current U.S. plans, and that our allies worry about
a
new arms race. But China and Russia know they have nothing to fear from American missile
defense. The United States pursues cooperative policies toward both. Can anyone imagine how
either China or Russia would profit by turning its back on the West? Moscow once opposed
German unification and NATO expansion, too. But confidence and conviction on our part proved
ultimately persuasive, and the sky did not fall.

There is no evidence to suggest that constructive arms control and nonproliferation policies
are
incompatible with prudent steps toward missile defense. It’s time to leave the old Cold War
thinking behind and get on with the task of defending the American people and our allies.

Jeffrey Gedmin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Jon Kyl is a
Republican senator from Arizona and a member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee.