Truth or Consequences #8: The C.W.C. Will Exacerbate The Proliferation Of Chemical Warfare Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.): In recent days,
proponents of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) have taken to
dissembling about the clear meaning —
and certain effect — of the treaty’s
Article XI. Article XI says, in part:
“…States parties
shall…undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange
of chemicals, equipment and
scientific and technical
information relating to
the development and application
of chemistry for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention;
What is more — as noted in the
in the current edition of the New
Republic by Douglas J. Feith, a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense responsible for chemical arms
control during the Reagan Administration
and founding member of Center Board of
Advisors — Article XI goes on to say:
“[States parties
shall] not maintain among
themselves any restrictions,
including those in any
international agreements,
incompatible with the obligations
undertaken under this Convention,
which would restrict or impede
trade and the development and
promotion of scientific and
technological knowledge in the
field of chemistry for
industrial, agricultural,
research, medical, pharmaceutical
or other peaceful purposes….”
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, the CWC’s Article X declares
that “Every state party shall have
the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material
and scientific and technological
information concerning means of
protection against chemical
weapons.”
‘Poisons for Peace’
Any reasonable reading of this
language shows that these
provisions would require the United
States (in the event it ratifies the
Convention) to provide other states
parties — including in all likelihood
countries like Iran, Cuba, China and
Russia — with state-of-the-art
manufacturing capabilities and defensive
technologies with direct relevance
to chemical warfare activities.
After all, advanced facilities
designed to manufacture pesticides,
fertilizers and pharmaceuticals have the
inherent capacity to produce chemical
weapons in substantial quantities.
Supplying potential adversaries with
modern chemical defensive gear could
equip them to engage in chemical war.
It could, in addition, aid in efforts to
defeat Western protective equipment. As
the Center recently reported,(1)
General Norman Schwartzkopf recently
reacted with incredulity and horror when
advised that the CWC, which he has
endorsed, would have such effects.
Will the U.S. Violate the
CWC?
Remarkably, the Clinton Administration
and other CWC advocates are now claiming
that the United States will not be
compelled by this treaty to transfer to
nations like Iran and Cuba chemical
technology that will lend itself to
diversion for military purposes.
Presumably, they think they will not have
to abide by the treaty’s
“obligation” to provide
chemical defensive gear to Teheran or
Havana, either. Maybe so. Still, it
would be helpful to establish in advance
— and formally codify in any resolution
of ratification — precisely which of the
CWC’s provisions the United States will
not observe. Such a step would
do much to protect against the
predictable post-ratification demand from
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and
State Department lawyers to the effect
that the United States must faithfully
observe all of the treaty’s
articles and obligations.
Even If We Don’t, Who Else
Will Observe Export Controls?
As Mr. Feith observes, even if the
United States does selectively
adhere to the Convention and maintains
export controls (not to say embargoes)
against Iran and Cuba, however, “Articles
X an XI will invite other countries to
transfer dangerous technology to them.
Germany can be expected to invoke the
treaty against any U.S. official who
protests a planned sale of a chemical
factory to, say, Iran.” CWC
advocates’ assurances to the contrary
notwithstanding, voluntary
supplier control arrangements like the
Australia Group are likely to fall victim
to the CWC-blessed, trade uber alles
appetites of such “friendly”
nations.(2)
What is more, one can safely predict
that the prospect of foreign competitors
closing such sales will cause would-be
American suppliers to seize upon these
same provisions to argue that Washington
has neither the right nor an interest in
penalizing U.S. firms. This punch has
been telegraphed by the emphasis the
frantically pro-CWC Chemical
Manufacturers Association has placed on
the opportunity the Convention will
create for increasing exports, presumably
to countries where such U.S. exports are
not currently permitted.
The Bottom Line
Douglas Feith’s essay in the New
Republic and an op.ed. by former
Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger,
Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger
which appeared in the Washington Post
yesterday(3)
make one point crystal clear: CWC
Articles X and XI are but two of the
myriad reasons why the United States
would be better off not being a
party to this Convention.
The Senate would be well-advised to
give these arguments careful
consideration. Indeed, it would
make sense to defer action on the
treaty’s ratification until after it had
been in force for some period so as to
evaluate whether these unintended and
counterproductive effects are as serious
in practice as in prospect they would
appear likely to be. Either way,
the Senate should resist the pressure to
rubber-stamp this accord — pressure that
will only intensify as treaty advocates
realize that time is no more on their
side than are the merits of the case.
– 30 –
1. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Gen. Schwartzkopf
Tells Senate He Shares Critics’ Concerns
About Details of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (
February 1997).
2. For more on
German behavior unbecoming an ally, see
the Center’s Watch on the Rhine series
, e.g., Watch On The Rhine:
German Efforts To Extort The Czechs,
Forge Relations With Rogue States Are
Ominous Indicators (
10 December 1996) and Watch
On The Rhine #2: Germany Proceeds With
Bait-And-Switch Encouraging Sudeten
Claims And Moves To Reschedule Syrian
Debt (
19 December 1996).
3. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled Truth Or
Consequences #7: Schlesinger, Rumsfeld
And Weinberger Rebut Scowcroft And Deutch
On The C.W.C. (
March 1997).
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