U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

IV. REQUIRED: A CREDIBLE U.S.  NUCLEAR DETERRENT

A. The Vital Role of  Extended Deterrence

The  Strategic Posture Commission placed particular emphasis on the abiding – and arguably growing –  importance of America’s nuclear umbrella:

•     “Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals….The U.S. deterrent must be both visible and credible, not only to our possible adversaries, but to our allies as well.”⁵⁴ (Emphasis in the original.)

•     “As long as we need to maintain such forces, our challenge is to define a nuclear program that contributes to decreasing the global dangers of proliferation, including maintaining the needed reliability, safety and security of our nuclear weapons and maintaining the role they play in overall stability and the reassurance of allies. Given the uncertainties in the factors affecting global security today, the need for deterrence (and  extended deterrence) could extend for an indefinite future….”⁵⁵ (Emphasis added.)

The Commission’s Final Report stressed one key ingredient to a successful extended deterrent: not only maintaining credible nuclear forces, but also  clearly articulating to allies and adversaries alike the willingness of the United States to  use them, if necessary:

“Effective deterrence and assurance requires that U.S. declaratory policy be understood to reflect the intentions of national leadership….The United States should reaffirm that the purpose of its nuclear force is deterrence, as broadly defined to include also assurance of its allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries.”⁵⁶

Senior officials from the U.S. military and the National Nuclear Security Administration have made similar arguments in support of the American nuclear arsenal’s utility in maintaining international stability – both by providing assurance to friends and  allies and by dissuading our enemies from using such weapons:

•     STRATCOM Commander General Chilton (March 2009):  “Maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent capability should be seen as an important nonproliferation tool for both deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies.”⁵⁷

•     NNSA Administrator D’Agostino (February 2008):  “…A safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear  deterrent, credibly extended to our allies, supports U.S. nonproliferation efforts because allies confident in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees will not be motivated to pursue their own nuclear forces.  This non- proliferation role of U.S. nuclear weapons is often underestimated.  Indeed, the nuclear weapon programs of North Korea and Iran have made our nuclear guarantees to allies such as Turkey, South Korea and Japan take on renewed importance.”⁵⁸

As the New Deterrent Working Group stated previously:

“America must re-establish the posture of nuclear strength which saved the West—and the world—during the half-century-long Cold War.⁵⁹ During those decades, our nuclear posture was also the key factor in preventing renewed outbreaks of global conventional wars and the terrible costs they entail.”⁶⁰

B. Addressing the ‘Peer Competitor’ Threat 

Failure properly to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent – either by deploying a numerically inadequate force structure or by fielding forces that are qualitatively inappropriate to the evolving threats and the attendant deterrent requirements – could very well encourage the rise of aspiring “peer competitors,” thus exacerbating the very proliferation of nuclear weapons we seek to prevent.

The Strategic Posture Commission’s interim report identified this risk with respect to future negotiations with Russia and its impact on the U.S.-China nuclear balance:

“The Commission is prepared strongly to endorse negotiations with Russia in order to proceed jointly to further reductions in our nuclear forces, as part of a cooperative effort to stabilize relations, stop proliferation, and promote predictability  and transparency. The large Russian arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons must be considered in this regard.”⁶¹

The Commission warned though that: “…Any negotiated reduction between Russia and the U.S. should not be carried out in a manner that might incentivize the Chinese to undertake a program to increase their nuclear capabilities in an effort to compete with us.”⁶²