U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

•     “[Russia] stores thousands of [tactical nuclear] weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals.  The United States deploys a small fraction of that number in support of nuclear sharing agreements in NATO.”¹¹¹

•     “The United States should…retain capabilities for the delivery of non-strategic nuclear weapons and proceed in close consultation with allies in Europe and Asia in doing so.”¹¹²

•     “How should non-strategic nuclear weapons be accounted for?  The imbalance favoring Russia is worrisome, including for allies, and it will become more worrisome as the number of strategic weapons is decreased.  Dealing with this imbalance is urgent and, indeed, some commissioners would give priority to this over taking further steps to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.”¹¹³

•     “U.S. policy [on non-strategic nuclear forces, or NSNF] should be guided by two principles.  First, the United States should seek substantial reductions in the large force of Russian NSNF.  Second, no changes to the U.S. force posture should be made without comprehensive consultations with all U.S. allies (and within NATO as such).”¹¹⁴

E. Reject U.S. Policies and Practices that

Serve to Increase Proliferation

Last but not least, a fundamental reevaluation is in order of the role of the United States with respect to enforcement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  As the  New Deterrent Working Group put it:

“The Nonproliferation Treaty’s purpose is to prevent proliferation, codifying the right of five nations—the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—to be nuclear weapons states and requiring all other signatories to remain non-nuclear-weapons states. Each of the 188 signatory states has voluntarily accepted this inequality and endorsed a treaty that calls for negotiations to reduce their nuclear arsenals – an obligation the U.S. has satisfied many times over –places no restrictions whatsoever on the five nuclear weapons states as regards designing, testing, producing, and deploying nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁵

Although the NPT calls for good faith negotiations eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons, the treaty makes clear that such a goal can only be achieved in the context of general and complete disarmament. This linkage is easily understood given the strategic environment at the time of the treaty’s signing. The US and NATO would never have given up their nuclear deterrent in light of the very large quantitative and qualitative conventional force advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, one of the key reasons for the maintenance of a US nuclear arsenal was its deterrent value in stopping a Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe.

In light of these hard realities, the  New Deterrent Working Group recommended that:

•     “Given the aforementioned hard strategic realities, the United States should redirect its nonproliferation policy along the following lines: (1) emphasize that nonproliferation requires enforcement; (2) urge that the five nuclear-weapons states accept this implicit responsibility; (3) until all five agree, be willing to act unilaterally, or in coalition, as a default action to prevent proliferation; and (4) regularly modernize our stockpile to keep it effective, safe, secure, reliable, and able to enforce nonproliferation. Without these actions, the remnants of global nonproliferation will inevitably become ever-more irrelevant and ineffectual.”¹¹⁶

•     Enforcement of proliferation norms requires some imagination. A host of possible actions could be implemented, some of which are part of our current strategy but which need further implementation and coordination; others are not currently in the policy “tool kit.” These include: elimination strategies (such as verifiable, effective arms control, regime change, interdiction of nuclear technology, divestment from terror and terror sponsoring states, effective economic sanctions, blockades) as well as preventive measures (such as deterrence, nuclear forensics, port and maritime security initiatives, deterrence, portal monitors, border security.)  In addition, more forcible military option involving both counter-terrorism efforts and pre-emptive military strikes must be considered where appropriate and necessary.

The New Deterrent Working Group concluded that:

•     “…The nation must decide between weakness and strength  now. Adopting the former by continuing the 18-year-long postCold War status quo can only lead to dangerous, unilateral US nuclear disarmament. We would be ill advised to adopt the agenda for accelerated dismantling of our nuclear arsenal now promoted as a way to “reinvigorate” the moribund nonproliferation regime. Champions of the latter idea propose, among other things, that we (1) cut our nuclear stockpile below its already vastly reduced level, (2) commit irrevocably (by treaty) to forgo necessary testing, and (3) refrain from all  essential nuclear modernization or replacement activities. They believe that doing so will cause our adversaries to reduce their arsenals and motivate the entire world eventually to abandon nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁷

•     “Regrettably, there is no basis in past experience or in logic for these lofty hopes. To the contrary, history has clearly shown that unilateral US reductions, far from causing a similar response, actually stimulate nuclear buildups by adversaries. Second, as a practical matter, it would be impossible to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Third, reduced numbers encourage first strikes designed to disarm. Fourth, and most importantly, the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear arms is not only unachievable but also a utopian delusion. Nuclear weapons cannot be ‘uninvented.’ Pursuit of such a goal by the United States would constitute a formula for the further evisceration of America’s deterrent and for a world in which only the most dangerous states and perhaps non-state actors have these weapons—a world of unimaginable horror and chaos.”¹¹⁸