U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

3: ‘Brain Drain’ – The U.S. weapons complex’s decline in nuclear expertise

The nuclear stockpile, and the underlying infrastructure, cannot be sustained as physical entities alone.  Credible and effective deterrence must necessarily rely upon a deep knowledge base of individuals with experience and expertise in designing, testing, and maintaining nuclear weapons.   Alarmingly, the United States is experiencing a level of “brain drain” in this regard that calls into serious question our ability to maintain, let alone modernize, the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

The following observations highlight the gravity of this situation:

•     The Strategic Posture Commission (May 2009): “The Commission’s second main concern about the nuclear weapons complex is that the intellectual infrastructure there is in serious trouble – perhaps more so than the physical complex itself.  It strongly recommends that significant steps be taken to remedy the situation.”²⁹

“The Commission believes that it is important to conduct a rigorous assessment of the numbers of scientists and technicians needed by discipline to maintain and support the weapons program.”³⁰

“Attracting and retaining the top national talent and expertise requires that the laboratories conduct challenging research on important national problems.  This program of work must be sustained and predictable and exercise the full range of laboratory skills, including nuclear weapon design skills.  Exercising these design skills is necessary to maintain design and production engineering capabilities.  Skills that are not exercised will atrophy.”³¹

•     Secretary of Defense Gates (October 2008): “The U.S. is experiencing a serious brain drain in the loss of veteran nuclear weapons designers and technicians.  Since the mid-1990s, the National Nuclear

Security Administration has lost more than a quarter of its workforce.  Half of our nuclear lab scientists are over 50 years old, and many of those under 50 have had limited or no involvement in the design and development of a nuclear weapon.  By some estimates, within the next several years, three-quarters of the workforce in nuclear engineering and at the national laboratories will reach retirement age.”³²

“No one has designed a new nuclear weapon in the United States since the 1980s, and no one has built a new one since the early 1990s.”³³

•     STRATCOM Commander General Chilton (March 2008): “The last nuclear design engineer to participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon is scheduled to retire in the next five years.”³⁴

[If undertaken,] “The  transition to a more modern stockpile will re-invigorate the design and engineering technology base – especially its human resources – and enable a more responsive and cost-effective infrastructure.  A revitalized infrastructure will facilitate a reduction of the large inventory of weapons we maintain today as a hedge against strategic uncertainty and weapon reliability concerns, and will allow us to sustain our nuclear capability and expertise throughout the 21^st Century.”³⁵

•     NNSA Administrator D’Agostino (March 2009):  “In addition, maintaining a capability means maintaining the skills of the people who understand plutonium, including both plutonium research and component manufacturing.  In the end, we are best served by exercising the capability to conduct advanced plutonium research and to manufacture plutonium components in facilities designed to meet 21^st Century security, safety and health requirements.”³⁶

•     Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Anastasio (April 2008): “There is a continued decline in the number of people in the complex who have direct experience with the design, manufacture, and testing of an actual weapon.”³⁷

•     The New Deterrent Working Group: “The problem is not confined to the weapons themselves. At the nuclear labs and plants operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the human and physical infrastructure essential to our deterrent is in real jeopardy. There is virtually no one left in that once-great industrial enterprise who has ever designed, tested, or produced a nuclear weapon.”³⁸