A Molotov Cocktail in the Age of Terror: Proliferation of Russian WMD and the Spread of Radical Islamism in Central Asia

Absent the Kremlin’s recent coolness towards the United States, Russia’s vast arsenal is still a concern due to woefully inadequate security. While post-Cold War arms treaties kept relatively close tabs on Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons, they never monitored tactical weapons. This is discomforting given that tactical nuclear weapons are designed for use on the front-lines, making them relatively mobile. Ideally suited for nuclear terrorism, Russiais equipped with weapons that can be carried by two people and are 60 times stronger than the atomic bombs used in Hiroshimaand Nagasaki.^[8]

While Russian military leaders insist that all tactical nuclear weapons are “accounted for,” evidence of lax security draws these claims into question.^[9] Indeed, former Russian national security chief, Alexander Lebed, stated that 100 one-kiloton “suit-case sized” bombs went missing as early as 1996.^[10] While this claim was refuted by the Russian government, senior Yeltsin advisors testified that the former president ordered the development of weapons that were “kept secret from the Russian military” and, therefore, were never a part of the official weapons count.^[11] Even those who insist that theft of Russian nuclear weapons is unlikely admit that decommissioned warheads are at risk, particularly when being transported. Furthermore, U.S. General Accounting Office inspectors found that laboratories housing dangerous pathogens were secured “only by small padlocks” and door-jams “sealed with wax and string.”^[12] This pathetic security apparatus remains, despite hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to “upgrade security at 123 nuclear weapons and material storage sites” throughout the Federation.^[13]

Though unfathomable, gross neglect of a nuclear weapons program is not particularly shocking in a country such as Russia. One need simply walk through the streets of Moscowto realize that its citizens are still largely imbued with the remarkable lack of respect for public property that was inevitably fostered during the Soviet era. Despite recent economic improvements, Russiacontinues to be a nation of discontents who work long hours and receive insufficient pay. For example, members of the Russian Army’s 12^th Department earn no more than $70 to $110 a month, though their duties involve protection of invaluable weapons sites.^[14] Certainly meager by Western standards, this salary is entirely insufficient in Russia’s exorbitantly expensive cities. It should also be noted that Russia requires two years of military service from all eighteen year old male citizens, provided that they are not attending university or able to bribe army officials with a sufficient vziatka. Thus, the military is filled with embittered and impoverished young men who do the bare minimum required to survive their tour of duty.

Poorly paid and unmotivated, these soldiers are unlikely to provide the high level performance required when protecting a vast cache of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. To be sure, former commander of the 12^th Department, Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin, stated that the greatest threat to weapon security came from “people who worked with nuclear weapons in the past,” “social malcontents,” and “embittered individuals.”^[15] This description fits the Russian soldier perfectly. It takes little imagination to envision a young man neglecting his duties for want of motivation or, worse still, giving terrorists access to weapons sites in exchange for money. Thus, Russia’s weapons of mass destruction are potentially irresistible temptations to both the underpaid soldier and the radical Islamist.