A Molotov Cocktail in the Age of Terror: Proliferation of Russian WMD and the Spread of Radical Islamism in Central Asia

The above mentioned distinction is critical to the idea that Putin would prevent arms proliferation for fear of additional terrorist attacks. Obviously, he would not engage in arms deals with Chechen rebels. However, this does not mean that he would refuse to sell weapons to other Central Asian groups. Putin’s decision would ultimately be influenced by his perception of Islamist terrorism. If he perceives it to be directed exclusively towards theUnited States and its closest allies, then he may feel comfortable providing weapons to potentially violent organizations. On the other hand, should Putin correctly realize that jihadist terrorism is aimed at the entire Western world, of which Russia is a part, he may have second thoughts. Unfortunately, a shocking number of people refuse to believe that Islamist terrorists are engaged in a clash of civilizations with the Judeo-Christian world. Such a misperception coupled with a desire to weaken theUnited Statesmay be sufficient to negate the “better judgment” rationale. While a degree of general understanding is present in Putin’s argument that the Beslan massacre resulted from “international terrorism aimed at breaking up Russia,” his 2005 decision to supply fuel for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor suggests that he fails to grasp the seriousness of weapon proliferation in an age of Islamist extremism.

Nonetheless, let us assume that Putin realizes the global nature of the Islamist threat and decides against selling weapons to countries that harbor terrorist organizations. Unfortunately for the West, this does not mean that Russian weapons will avoid Central Asia. While the Kremlin may feel uncomfortable arming predominately Muslim nations, there is no guarantee that these concerns are shared by countries that actually receive weapons from the Federation. Though entirely hypothetical, the following scenario could result in an armed Central Asia.

As previously stated, Venezuela received considerable amounts of conventional weapons from Russia this year. Hugo Chavez simultaneously made overtures towards North Korea by publicly supporting its missile tests and entering into discussions with regard to opening an embassy in Pyongyang. Were Venezuela to receive WMD or their component parts from Russia, a portion could be sold discretely to North Korea, which could in turn provide a similar service to Iran. In fact, warm relations between Chavez and Ahmadinejad make it entirely possible for Venezuela to provide weapons to Iran directly. In a nation based upon the tenants of Islamism, Iranian leaders would have little objection to sharing the wealth with their Muslim brethren in Central Asia. Thus, by selling weapons to Venezuela, Putin has theoretically involved his country in a cycle that could arm radical Islamists along its southern border. In a world of rapid communication and transportation, weapons intended for one country could easily be transferred to others. In this way, Russia is left unaware of who ultimately possesses its weapons and against whom they are directed.

Conclusions

In a final evaluation, American policy makers must acknowledge the seriousness of the Russian threat to global security vis-à-vis its insufficiently secured weapons programs. Still one of the world’s greatest nuclear powers, Russia could be the source of a nuclear holocaust waged against the Western world. This risk appears all the more menacing when one considers President Putin’s gradual movement away from democracy and into the arms of such anti-Americans as Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. While we can always hope that the Russian president will be tempered by the voice of reason, he has expressed a desire to weaken the United States through his participation in Venezuelan arms deals and Iranian nuclear development. The hunger for power is an overwhelming and disorienting sensation. We can but hope that Vladimir Vladimirovich recognizes its strength before he makes a decision we live to regret.