Contain and Transcend: A Strategy for Regime Change in North Korea
The Strategy: “Outputs”
While the “inputs” side of this strategy is purely a financial numbers game, the outputs section serves as the more imaginative approach, with its focus on the North Korean society. To maintain control, the DPRK has sought to prevent both individuals and information from leaving the country. This in turn forces it to isolate its people from the outside world so as to ensure that they are not aware of its wealth and success. By doing this, the government has been able to convince its people that their situation is in fact desirable, and actually better than that of countries such as South Korea and the United States.
To compliment our financial “inputs” strategy, we should also seek to de-legitimize the regime in the eyes of its own people and the world by aiding North Korea citizens – the real victims of the regime’s unrelenting quest for power. We can do this by politicizing and weaponizing their cause on several different fronts. Internally, we should seek to pry open the monopoly the government holds on information, and begin to flood the country with news and stories from the outside world. Externally, we should criticize the countries human rights record, encourage and assist escapees, and politicize the stories of those who do escape to both the outside world and back into North Korea.
While the DPRK has thus far been successful at controlling all information within the country, recent events have shown that an increasingly steady flow of information has begun to seep in. This increase occurred in the last fifteen years, (since the fall of theSoviet Union) and is largely the result of a rise in smuggling, trading, and refugees along the Chinese-DPRK border.
Because what is known of the outside world is so well controlled, our methods of countering state-controlled knowledge must begin with an effective, yet primitive, tool: the radio.
All publicly owned radios in the DPRK are pre-set to specific stations (this is strictly enforced by the leader of the local inminban, which are small groups consisting of 40-50 people). However, technological advancements over the past several decades have made radios smaller and more efficient. What is known as the “wind-up” radio, used during psychological warfare in Operation Enduring Freedom, is one such radio. These radios are extremely small (they can fit in a small container or behind a wall) and take only a few winds to create enough energy to listen to a broadcast.[xxi] This should be our weapon of choice in the information war. TheUS should buy several hundred thousand of these radios and begin to smuggle them into the country. A less risky option would have them smuggled in through the Chinese border, while a more risky option might mean dropping them in by balloon. Whichever the method, we should ensure that they make their way into the hands of the North Korean people so that they may have access to Radio Free Asia and other broadcasts out ofEast Asia. Accompanying these broadcasts should be news from the outside, as well as interviews with former dissidents and everyday success stories from South Korean business people and families.
On the outside, we have several tasks in need of continued improvements. The nomination of Jay Lefkowitz as Special Envoy to North Korea under the North Korean Human Rights (NKHRA) act of 2004 was a good start. Lefkowitz has thus far been reasonably successful – his recent opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal serves as a good example of the type of high-profile work his office needs to continually produce. Furthermore, Lefkowitz’s upcoming visit to the DPRK will serve as a platform from which to voice concern over North Korean human rights issues and put further pressure on the regime. If Lefkowitz can manage to stay on the offensive, continually pushing and challenging the regime from different angels, he will make the headlines and continue to bring media attention to the issue.
