(Washington, D.C.): Opponents of U.S. missile defenses — within the
Clinton-Gore
Administration, among think-tanks and punditry, in foreign capitals (both allied and historically
unfriendly ones) and the press — are mobilizing in an eleventh-hour effort to prevent an
American deployment of effective anti-missile systems. Particularly notable is the role being
played by the U.S. media, both on editorial pages and in news articles (notably, the New
York
Times’
relentless crusade against the proponents of missile defense and their cause) and on
the
television and radio airwaves.

For example, the National Public Radio “Morning Edition” program today completed a
four-part
series assailing the efforts to bring missile defenses to fruition. These unbalanced reports must
have gladdened the hearts of public radio’s foundation sponsors like the Ploughshares, W. Alton
Jones and MacArthur — philanthropic champions of an array of “global security” programs
hostile to U.S. sovereignty and military programs and power who are spending millions of
dollars annually to thwart the fielding of American anti-missile capabilities.

Every once in a while, however, these press salvos result in unintentional “friendly fire.” A
case
in point is the column published by Mary McGrory in today’s Washington Post. In
it, Ms.
McGrory goes beyond reaffirming her longstanding, ideologically rooted opposition to missile
defenses. She actually denounces Democrats for suppressing their abiding support for her
position in order to provide political cover for themselves and their presidential candidate in the
2000 election.

It would be highly desirable if Democrats who Ms. McGrory confirms are being
disingenuous in
their support for missile defense will stop “triangulating” the issue and come clean. Then, at
least, the public could be afforded a real opportunity to decide whether they prefer candidates
who are committed to defending them against missile attack, come what may, or candidates who
think such defenses are unnecessary, unworkable and/or unaffordable. As it happens, a catalyst
for such a debate appeared in an op.ed. article in today’s New York Times. It was
authored by
one of Governor Bush’s top national security advisors, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle, and underscores the candidate’s expressed interest in a sea-based missile defense
that promises to be militarily robust, cost-effective and global in its coverage.

The New York Times, 13 July 2000

A Better Way to Build a Missile Defense

By Richard Perle

Far from lamenting last week’s highly publicized test failure, advocates of a defense against
ballistic missiles should rejoice. The move to deploy an ill-conceived system supported by the
Clinton administration has been stymied, and the prospect of a far more effective defense is
greatly increased.

The system that failed in Saturday’s test conformed to the main provisions of the 1972 ABM
treaty between the United States and the late Soviet Union. That treaty, which became defunct
when the Soviet Union collapsed, expressly prohibits the deployment of national missile
defenses and allows only a tiny, highly localized defense based on old, ground-based technology.
So it is hardly surprising that a system designed to fit within it, like the one the administration is
recommending, would turn out to be inadequate.

The system’s inadequacy is inherent in its technology and architecture. It relies on a small
number of ground-launched interceptors, based on U.S. territory, that must be maneuvered with
astounding precision to collide with incoming warheads at closing speeds of 15,000 miles per
hour.

Since each enemy missile may carry several nuclear warheads, along with a large number of
decoys, the 100 interceptors could be overwhelmed. And the interceptors will have only one
shot: there is no chance to fire a second time if an interceptor misses.

To make matters worse, the entire system depends on a small number of ground-based
radars,
including one located on Shemya Island in Alaska. If that single radar were destroyed, the entire
system would be disabled. Surely nations capable of building long-range ballistic missiles and
nuclear warheads could damage or destroy a large, immobile radar on that frozen, barren island.

If this technology is so fragile, why build it when the potential exists for a far more effective
missile defense system? Unfortunately, the Clinton administration’s primary concern seems to be
the defense of the ABM treaty. Administration officials are prepared to subordinate military
effectiveness to a 30-year-old treaty that they persist in calling a “cornerstone” of stability.

A more effective system, although inconsistent with the treaty, would intercept hostile
missiles
(or missiles launched accidentally) early in their flight, just after lift-off, during what is known as
the “boost phase.” Television viewers familiar with shuttle launches have seen the booster
rockets lift the shuttle into space, plumes of flame burning brightly as the shuttle rises gracefully
into space. Similar rockets can, and do, deliver nuclear warheads.

During the boost phase, missiles move relatively slowly. They are easy to pinpoint: the
intense
heat from their rocket motors is readily detected by sensors based on satellites. If hostile rockets
are intercepted in the beginning, during the boost phase, as opposed to the “terminal” phase of
the administration’s system, there are neither decoys nor multiple warheads to contend with. A
successful intercept destroys all the warheads and all the decoys before they can be separated
from the rocket that carries them into space.

Moreover, a properly configured missile defense system protects widely. A missile destroyed
in
the boost phase will never reach its intended target — whether it is Washington or Paris or
American forces abroad.

One approach to a national missile defense would be to deploy interceptors on Navy ships,
possibly on Aegis cruisers, which could then be positioned as necessary. Such a sea-based
system might work together with lasers and other devices in space to provide a limited but
technologically sophisticated system with global reach and effectiveness.

Opponents of a robust missile defense argue that it would encourage the proliferation of
nuclear
weapons and lead to instability. The opposite is far more likely. Imagine a sharp rise in tension
between India and Pakistan. Both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Suppose
the United States could dispatch an Aegis cruiser to the region with instructions to intercept any
ballistic missile fired by either side. Such a capability in American hands would be highly
stabilizing, reducing the likelihood of conflict, discouraging the use of offensive missiles,
reassuring both sides.

Other nations, like Iran, Iraq and North Korea, are actively trying to acquire missiles capable
of
attacking the United States. They believe that acquiring even a single missile will catapult them
into a select class of states capable of inflicting massive damage on the United States. Given time
and money, a single missile, or even several, is not beyond their reach.

But suppose that we were to construct a defense that could intercept all the warheads and
decoys
carried by 100 or 200 enemy missiles. A Saddam Hussein or a Kim Jung Il would need that
number to be confident he could land a missile on New York or Chicago or an allied capital. In
that case, even a determined adversary might well throw up his hands and conclude that such a
missile force is beyond his reach.

The best way to protect against a missile attack is to discourage our adversaries from
investing in
the missiles in the first place. There can be no more powerful disincentive than to have a shield
that guarantees their hugely expensive programs will fail. It is that shield, based on our most
advanced technology — not an outdated treaty — that will protect us best.

Richard Perle, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was assistant secretary for
international security policy at the Defense Department from 1981 to 1987. He is an adviser to
Gov. George W. Bush.

Center for Security Policy

Please Share:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *