Parameters Emerge for Nuclear Deal with Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) agreed this afternoon to the parameters of a deal intended to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. While no agreement was actually signed and the parties have until June 30^th to finalize the details, today was a noteworthy step in the process.

According to the U.S. State Department, Iran must reduce its number of installed centrifuges from 19,000 to about 6,100, coincidentally the number of centrifuges Iran had when President Obama entered office. These centrifuges will be basic models, and Tehran will not be allowed to enrich with advanced centrifuges for ten years. Furthermore, Iran agreed to not enrich uranium above 3.67% for 15 years. Any excess enrichment infrastructure is supposed to be placed under IAEA supervision and only used to replace operating equipment.

The sole enrichment facility allowed will be Natanz, Iran’s largest uranium enrichment plant. Fordow, an underground enrichment site near the city of Qom, will be converted into a nuclear physics research center with centrifuges, where no fissile material is allowed. Arak, the heavy water reactor for producing plutonium, will be dismantled and turned into a nuclear research facility, with its current fuel sent out of the country.

The IAEA is supposed to have “regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities,” but most of the specifics regarding inspections and transparency, an essential part of any agreement, still need to be discussed. Iran has historically stonewalled inspectors, not giving them full access to its nuclear facilities.

In exchange for abiding by the aforementioned rules, Iran will receive significant sanctions relief. After Tehran takes “key nuclear-related steps,” the European Union and U.S. will suspend nuclear-related sanctions, allowing billions of dollars to flow back into Iran. Additionally, all U.N. Security Council resolutions will be lifted as Iran takes the necessary steps in this deal.

This understanding is far from final and may collapse before June 30^th, but these parameters define the framework from which both sides will work. President Obama called this plan “historic” and said it will prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb, keeping Tehran one year away from that goal.

While a diplomatic outcome is desirable, there are fundamental issues with the framework that need to be addressed in the coming months. Two of these potentially fatal flaws relate to breakout time and a “sunset clause.”

First, the administration has made clear that its barometer for a good deal is keeping Iran one year away from acquiring a weapon, a shift from America’s traditional policy of no enrichment. If a one-year breakout period is the baseline, then it requires exceptionally frequent and intrusive IAEA inspections for the international community to know if Iran is abiding by an agreement. Without unannounced inspections at any time, there is no way of knowing Iran’s progress. Iran may not agree to such terms, however, and given its record, is likely not to abide by them.

Second, the framework confirms that any nuclear deal will contain a 15-year sunset clause, where, after adhering to the agreement for this period, Iran will thereafter be able to enrich large amounts of uranium with advanced centrifuges beyond the 3.67% limit. Even before this point, Iran will be permitted to retain a large nuclear infrastructure under this agreement, thus putting itself in a strong position to possibly dash towards a weapon after 15 years.

Beyond the nuclear issue, the framework does not address Iran’s nefarious non-nuclear activities including its ballistic missile program, role as the largest state sponsor of terrorism, and attempt to dominate the Middle East. Tehran has consistently defied the international community, and there is a fear that negotiating such a deal with it will legitimize Iran’s aggressive, destabilizing actions.

It is unclear how a final deal will look and what changes will occur from now until June 30^th, but there are still major challenges in the interim. Because of the lack of clarity with inspections, a sunset clause, and nothing to deter Iran’s other dangerous activities, today’s framework raises serious questions that need to be addressed.