‘RECKLESS ABANDON(MENT)’: WILL APPROPRIATORS ENDANGER VITAL ALLIANCE TIES WITH TURKEY BY ENDING MILITARY AID?

(Washington, D.C.): Congressional
appropriators are being tempted to make
the classic penny-wise-pound-foolish
decision: Tomorrow afternoon, the Senate
Appropriations Committee will consider a
bill that will follow the lead of its
House counterpart and deny military grant
aid to one of the United States’ most
important alliance partners — the
Republic of Turkey.

Incredible as it might seem, the
House-passed FY1993 foreign aid
appropriations bill, H.R. 5368, not only
reduces the amount of military assistance
provided the Turks last year by $50
million but — by substituting the grants
of previous years with loans at
Treasury rates — the House measure also
imposes a financial burden that simply
cannot be borne by the government in
Ankara. The likely consequences
of such an initiative: Turkey’s vitally
needed military modernization program
will be jeopardized; its security
weakened; and its ability, and perhaps
its willingness, to play a vital,
constructive and pro-Western role in
neighboring regions seriously diminished.
The costs of such results to the U.S.
taxpayer will surely vastly exceed any
short-term savings associated with the
appropriators’ initiative.

Lest We Forget

The ostensible logic of this
initiative is that with the end of the
Cold War, Turkey will play a less
important role in the furtherance of U.S.
foreign and security policies. This is an
egregious miscalculation unsupported by
either recent experience or logic.

Ironically, the House Appropriations
Committee report accompanying the bill,
states “Programs in the Middle East
should be reviewed…taking into
consideration movement on the diplomatic
front and other regional
developments.” It is just such
developments
that underscore the
continuing — indeed increasing —
importance of a strong U.S. ally capable
of containing the ambitions of such
dangerous neighbors as Iraq, Iran and
Syria while contributing to the stability
of the Middle East, Central Asia and
southeastern Europe.

A Case in Point — The
Conflict With Iraq

It was just two years ago that the
importance of Turkey in the
“post-Cold War” world was
demonstrated vividly when it provided key
assistance to the allied cause in the
Persian Gulf War. In fact, it is no
overstatement to say that without
Ankara’s courageous and unwavering
support, there probably would have been
no Operation Desert Shield; there
certainly would have been no Desert Storm
.
After all, it was the Turks’ willingness
to take the considerable risks associated
with suspending Iraqi oil exports across
their soil in the aftermath of the
invasion of Kuwait that encouraged the
Saudis to do likewise and created the
conditions under which economic
sanctions, allied military deployments
and subsequent combat operations in the
region could be undertaken.

Turkey has been no less central to the
U.S.-led effort to contain Saddam Hussein
in the aftermath of the Gulf war. In this
test case of the prospects for a
“New World Order” built on
collective security arrangements and
alliance burden-sharing, Turkey’s
contributions in the form of permission
to use its bases to protect the Kurdish
population of northern Iraq and to
continue to enforce the ongoing embargo
against Baghdad have been of incalculable
value.

Turkey: Friend Indeed,
Friend in Need

Can the United States safely assume
that Turkey’s demonstrated importance in
the conflict with Iraq was an aberration,
a contribution once made and unlikely to
be repeated in other circumstances in the
future? A review of the facts strongly
suggests that such a conclusion is as
dangerously ill-informed as it would be
irresponsible:

  • Since its defeat in the war
    against Iraq, Iran
    has embarked upon an
    across-the-board effort to build
    up its offensive military
    capabilities, the most disturbing
    of which are programs to develop nuclear,
    chemical and biological weapons
    of mass destruction.

    Although the Rafsanjani regime
    is, for the moment, signalling a
    willingness to pursue a more
    pragmatic foreign policy, its
    continued actions
    suggest a determination to
    consolidate its position as a
    regional hegemon and to spread
    its influence to areas at further
    remove.
  • The mullahs view Turkey’s secular
    democratic tradition as one of
    the most important obstacles to
    their ambitious plans to dominate
    the Islamic world. They are,
    consequently, missing few
    opportunities to subvert the
    Turkish government (e.g., through
    support of the Marxist Kurdish
    Peoples Workers Party — the PKK)
    and to stymie Ankara’s laudable
    efforts to nurture pro-Western
    secular democracies in the
    Central Asian republics and
    elsewhere in the Muslim world.

  • Syria has proven
    through its accelerated military
    buildup and malevolent activities
    in Lebanon that it too has
    imperial ambitions in the region.
    The recently disclosed efforts by
    Syrian despot Hafez Assad to
    acquire from India 90 tons of
    trimethyl phosphate —
    ingredients for chemical weapons
    — are a timely reminder of the
    malevolence of his regime.
  • In addition, Syria continues to
    support international terrorism,
    including attacks aimed not only
    at American allies like Turkey
    and Israel but at U.S. personnel
    and assets as well. href=”#N_1_”>(1)

    Of particular
    concern is Syria’s ongoing
    support for the PKK, much of
    whose operations against Turkey
    are orchestrated from Syrian
    territory. As long as Damascus
    persists in such behavior, Syria
    will remain a threat to U.S.
    interests and peace in the Middle
    East.

  • Ethnic tension and irredentist
    quarrels continue to arise in and
    among Turkey’s neighbors who
    formerly comprised parts of the
    Soviet Union
    . The recent
    turmoil in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
    Georgia and Tajikistan underscore
    the volatile nature of the area
    and the potential for Turkish
    security to be jeopardized should
    such strife spread elsewhere in
    the region.
  • This is particularly true of the Central
    Asian republics
    . The
    United States and Turkey share a
    common interest in helping the
    Central Asian republics construct
    the administrative systems
    necessary for self-rule.
    Importantly, Turkey is in a
    position to use its ethnic
    connections as a link between the
    West and the newly independent
    republics. Should the
    nascent experiments in democracy
    and free enterprise collapse in
    these republics, the potential
    ramifications for the national
    security of the U.S. — in dollar
    costs for military preparedness
    and human costs due to the
    regional conflicts likely to
    ensue — could be staggering
    .
    America’s assistance in
    establishing a leading role for
    Turkey in the area will decrease
    the likelihood of future
    conflicts that might necessitate
    direct U.S. involvement.

  • Turkey also has an historical
    interest in the fate of fellow
    Muslims in Bosnia.
    It is far preferable for Western
    interests that Turkey — rather
    than Iran — play a role in a
    coordinated effort to relieve the
    suffering of the Bosnian people.

Against this backdrop, the importance
of ensuring that Turkey maintains an
effective, modern military — capable of
defending its own territory and
supporting alliance security arrangements
— should be self-evident. Far from
becoming expendable in the post-Cold War
world, a strong and secure Turkey is
arguably more important today
than ever before.

The Effect of the House
Appropriations Committee’s Action

The modernization and
reorganization of Turkey’s armed forces
can, as a practical matter, only be
achieved through American military aid.

In prior years, this aid has been
provided almost exclusively through
grants. By stipulating that such military
aid would only be available in FY1993
through loans bearing high rates of
interest, the House Foreign Operations
bill effectively denies Turkey the
ability to undertake such a necessary
modernization.

This is especially true in light of
the Gulf war. The Turkish economy has
been ravaged by the conflict and Ankara’s
continued enforcement of the embargo;
some estimates of the toll taken have run
as high as $7 to 10 billion.
These economic realities have not been
overlooked by the Bush Administration,
which in a 24 June 1992 policy statement
strongly rejected the House funding
reductions as detrimental to U.S. foreign
policy. It noted in part that, “Reductions
and the elimination of grant financing
for Turkey…could diminish our military
readiness in the Persian Gulf, the
Mediterranean and the Balkans.”

U.S. Defense Industry
Benefits

Another victim of the proposed budget
cuts would be a U.S. defense industrial
base already reeling from the combined
effects of a recession and draconian
contraction in American military
expenditures. In previous years, virtually
all
of the annual Foreign Military
Financing credits (FMF) provided to
Turkey came back to the United States via
the purchase of American products and
defense services. Accordingly, if the
level of grant aid sought by the
executive branch for Turkey in FY1993 is
approved, the United States stands to
gain over a half billion dollars in
contracts with Turkey. The benefits of
such a mutually beneficial relationship
are underscored by the recent decision of
the Turkish government to purchase the
U.S. Blackhawk helicopter over a host of
European competitors, at a cost of at
least $855 million.

The Bottom Line

The House Appropriations Committee
report on H.R. 5368 states that budget
priorities should recognize “the
real challenges and opportunities the
U.S. faces in a world that is undergoing
rapid changes…and address the real
long-term interests of the United
States.” Truer words have rarely
come out of a congressional committee.
Such an approach would, however,
necessitate a radically different
recommendation concerning military aid to
Turkey than that advanced by the House
committee.

In light of the epic political, social
and economic changes occurring in the
Middle East, Central Asia and
southeastern Europe, the United States
can ill afford to weaken or otherwise
undermine the one nation willing
and eager to play a constructive role in
all three regions — a nation with whom
it is fortunate to enjoy a very close
alliance relationship
. Only
freedom’s enemies in these regions will
benefit from the unnecessary, capricious
and highly counterproductive impact upon
U.S.-Turkish ties sure to flow if the
House action were to be endorsed by the
Senate.

Fortunately, there is reason to hope
that cooler heads will prevail in the
Senate. When the Senate Appropriations
Foreign Operations Subcommittee meets
tomorrow to mark up its version of H.R.
5368, an amendment to the bill will be
offered by Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS)
that would restore grant aid for Turkey
and other base rights countries. The
Center for Security Policy believes that
such an amendment is vitally needed and
urges members to support it despite the
abiding pressure for reductions in
foreign aid.

Senators will surely do so if, as they
should, they reflect upon the
indispensable role Turkey has played —
and will continue to play — in a part of
the world vital to U.S. interests.
Military grant aid to Turkey at levels
requested by the administration is a
sound investment in regional stability.
It will likely pay handsome dividends,
particularly when contrasted with the
certain and substantial costs to U.S.
foreign policy interests sure to arise
from doing less.

– 30 –

1. In
this regard, see the Center’s recent Decision
Brief
entitled “‘Getting
Away With Murder’: Bush-Baker Enable
Assad To Go On Sponsoring International
Terrorism”
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=92-D_102″>No. 92-D 102, 30
August 1992).

Center for Security Policy

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