‘RECKLESS ABANDON(MENT)’: WILL APPROPRIATORS ENDANGER VITAL ALLIANCE TIES WITH TURKEY BY ENDING MILITARY AID?

(Washington, D.C.): Congressional
appropriators are being tempted to make
the classic penny-wise-pound-foolish
decision: Tomorrow afternoon, the Senate
Appropriations Committee will consider a
bill that will follow the lead of its
House counterpart and deny military grant
aid to one of the United States’ most
important alliance partners — the
Republic of Turkey.

Incredible as it might seem, the
House-passed FY1993 foreign aid
appropriations bill, H.R. 5368, not only
reduces the amount of military assistance
provided the Turks last year by $50
million but — by substituting the grants
of previous years with loans at
Treasury rates — the House measure also
imposes a financial burden that simply
cannot be borne by the government in
Ankara. The likely consequences
of such an initiative: Turkey’s vitally
needed military modernization program
will be jeopardized; its security
weakened; and its ability, and perhaps
its willingness, to play a vital,
constructive and pro-Western role in
neighboring regions seriously diminished.
The costs of such results to the U.S.
taxpayer will surely vastly exceed any
short-term savings associated with the
appropriators’ initiative.

Lest We Forget

The ostensible logic of this
initiative is that with the end of the
Cold War, Turkey will play a less
important role in the furtherance of U.S.
foreign and security policies. This is an
egregious miscalculation unsupported by
either recent experience or logic.

Ironically, the House Appropriations
Committee report accompanying the bill,
states “Programs in the Middle East
should be reviewed…taking into
consideration movement on the diplomatic
front and other regional
developments.” It is just such
developments that underscore the
continuing — indeed increasing —
importance of a strong U.S. ally capable
of containing the ambitions of such
dangerous neighbors as Iraq, Iran and
Syria while contributing to the stability
of the Middle East, Central Asia and
southeastern Europe.

A Case in Point — The
Conflict With Iraq

It was just two years ago that the
importance of Turkey in the
“post-Cold War” world was
demonstrated vividly when it provided key
assistance to the allied cause in the
Persian Gulf War. In fact, it is no
overstatement to say that without
Ankara’s courageous and unwavering
support, there probably would have been
no Operation Desert Shield; there
certainly would have been no Desert Storm.
After all, it was the Turks’ willingness
to take the considerable risks associated
with suspending Iraqi oil exports across
their soil in the aftermath of the
invasion of Kuwait that encouraged the
Saudis to do likewise and created the
conditions under which economic
sanctions, allied military deployments
and subsequent combat operations in the
region could be undertaken.

Turkey has been no less central to the
U.S.-led effort to contain Saddam Hussein
in the aftermath of the Gulf war. In this
test case of the prospects for a
“New World Order” built on
collective security arrangements and
alliance burden-sharing, Turkey’s
contributions in the form of permission
to use its bases to protect the Kurdish
population of northern Iraq and to
continue to enforce the ongoing embargo
against Baghdad have been of incalculable
value.

Turkey: Friend Indeed,
Friend in Need

Can the United States safely assume
that Turkey’s demonstrated importance in
the conflict with Iraq was an aberration,
a contribution once made and unlikely to
be repeated in other circumstances in the
future? A review of the facts strongly
suggests that such a conclusion is as
dangerously ill-informed as it would be
irresponsible:

• Since its defeat in the war
  against Iraq, Iran
  has embarked upon an
  across-the-board effort to build
  up its offensive military
  capabilities, the most disturbing
  of which are programs to develop nuclear,
  chemical and biological weapons
  of mass destruction.
  Although the Rafsanjani regime
  is, for the moment, signalling a
  willingness to pursue a more
  pragmatic foreign policy, its
  continued actions
  suggest a determination to
  consolidate its position as a
  regional hegemon and to spread
  its influence to areas at further
  remove.
• The mullahs view Turkey’s secular
  democratic tradition as one of
  the most important obstacles to
  their ambitious plans to dominate
  the Islamic world. They are,
  consequently, missing few
  opportunities to subvert the
  Turkish government (e.g., through
  support of the Marxist Kurdish
  Peoples Workers Party — the PKK)
  and to stymie Ankara’s laudable
  efforts to nurture pro-Western
  secular democracies in the
  Central Asian republics and
  elsewhere in the Muslim world.

• Syria has proven
  through its accelerated military
  buildup and malevolent activities
  in Lebanon that it too has
  imperial ambitions in the region.
  The recently disclosed efforts by
  Syrian despot Hafez Assad to
  acquire from India 90 tons of
  trimethyl phosphate —
  ingredients for chemical weapons
  — are a timely reminder of the
  malevolence of his regime.
• In addition, Syria continues to
  support international terrorism,
  including attacks aimed not only
  at American allies like Turkey
  and Israel but at U.S. personnel
  and assets as well. href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

  Of particular
  concern is Syria’s ongoing
  support for the PKK, much of
  whose operations against Turkey
  are orchestrated from Syrian
  territory. As long as Damascus
  persists in such behavior, Syria
  will remain a threat to U.S.
  interests and peace in the Middle
  East.

• Ethnic tension and irredentist
  quarrels continue to arise in and
  among Turkey’s neighbors who
  formerly comprised parts of the
  Soviet Union. The recent
  turmoil in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
  Georgia and Tajikistan underscore
  the volatile nature of the area
  and the potential for Turkish
  security to be jeopardized should
  such strife spread elsewhere in
  the region.
• This is particularly true of the Central
  Asian republics. The
  United States and Turkey share a
  common interest in helping the
  Central Asian republics construct
  the administrative systems
  necessary for self-rule.
  Importantly, Turkey is in a
  position to use its ethnic
  connections as a link between the
  West and the newly independent
  republics. Should the
  nascent experiments in democracy
  and free enterprise collapse in
  these republics, the potential
  ramifications for the national
  security of the U.S. — in dollar
  costs for military preparedness
  and human costs due to the
  regional conflicts likely to
  ensue — could be staggering.
  America’s assistance in
  establishing a leading role for
  Turkey in the area will decrease
  the likelihood of future
  conflicts that might necessitate
  direct U.S. involvement.

• Turkey also has an historical
  interest in the fate of fellow
  Muslims in Bosnia.
  It is far preferable for Western
  interests that Turkey — rather
  than Iran — play a role in a
  coordinated effort to relieve the
  suffering of the Bosnian people.

Against this backdrop, the importance
of ensuring that Turkey maintains an
effective, modern military — capable of
defending its own territory and
supporting alliance security arrangements
— should be self-evident. Far from
becoming expendable in the post-Cold War
world, a strong and secure Turkey is
arguably more important today
than ever before.

The Effect of the House
Appropriations Committee’s Action

The modernization and
reorganization of Turkey’s armed forces
can, as a practical matter, only be
achieved through American military aid.
In prior years, this aid has been
provided almost exclusively through
grants. By stipulating that such military
aid would only be available in FY1993
through loans bearing high rates of
interest, the House Foreign Operations
bill effectively denies Turkey the
ability to undertake such a necessary
modernization.

This is especially true in light of
the Gulf war. The Turkish economy has
been ravaged by the conflict and Ankara’s
continued enforcement of the embargo;
some estimates of the toll taken have run
as high as $7 to 10 billion.
These economic realities have not been
overlooked by the Bush Administration,
which in a 24 June 1992 policy statement
strongly rejected the House funding
reductions as detrimental to U.S. foreign
policy. It noted in part that, “Reductions
and the elimination of grant financing
for Turkey…could diminish our military
readiness in the Persian Gulf, the
Mediterranean and the Balkans.”

U.S. Defense Industry
Benefits

Another victim of the proposed budget
cuts would be a U.S. defense industrial
base already reeling from the combined
effects of a recession and draconian
contraction in American military
expenditures. In previous years, virtually
all of the annual Foreign Military
Financing credits (FMF) provided to
Turkey came back to the United States via
the purchase of American products and
defense services. Accordingly, if the
level of grant aid sought by the
executive branch for Turkey in FY1993 is
approved, the United States stands to
gain over a half billion dollars in
contracts with Turkey. The benefits of
such a mutually beneficial relationship
are underscored by the recent decision of
the Turkish government to purchase the
U.S. Blackhawk helicopter over a host of
European competitors, at a cost of at
least $855 million.

The Bottom Line

The House Appropriations Committee
report on H.R. 5368 states that budget
priorities should recognize “the
real challenges and opportunities the
U.S. faces in a world that is undergoing
rapid changes…and address the real
long-term interests of the United
States.” Truer words have rarely
come out of a congressional committee.
Such an approach would, however,
necessitate a radically different
recommendation concerning military aid to
Turkey than that advanced by the House
committee.

In light of the epic political, social
and economic changes occurring in the
Middle East, Central Asia and
southeastern Europe, the United States
can ill afford to weaken or otherwise
undermine the one nation willing
and eager to play a constructive role in
all three regions — a nation with whom
it is fortunate to enjoy a very close
alliance relationship. Only
freedom’s enemies in these regions will
benefit from the unnecessary, capricious
and highly counterproductive impact upon
U.S.-Turkish ties sure to flow if the
House action were to be endorsed by the
Senate.

Fortunately, there is reason to hope
that cooler heads will prevail in the
Senate. When the Senate Appropriations
Foreign Operations Subcommittee meets
tomorrow to mark up its version of H.R.
5368, an amendment to the bill will be
offered by Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS)
that would restore grant aid for Turkey
and other base rights countries. The
Center for Security Policy believes that
such an amendment is vitally needed and
urges members to support it despite the
abiding pressure for reductions in
foreign aid.

Senators will surely do so if, as they
should, they reflect upon the
indispensable role Turkey has played —
and will continue to play — in a part of
the world vital to U.S. interests.
Military grant aid to Turkey at levels
requested by the administration is a
sound investment in regional stability.
It will likely pay handsome dividends,
particularly when contrasted with the
certain and substantial costs to U.S.
foreign policy interests sure to arise
from doing less.

– 30 –

1. In
this regard, see the Center’s recent Decision
Brief entitled “‘Getting
Away With Murder’: Bush-Baker Enable
Assad To Go On Sponsoring International
Terrorism” ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=92-D_102″>No. 92-D 102, 30
August 1992).