The Big Lie: Long-term U.S. Interests Will Not Be Served By Presidential Misrepresentation Of Chinese Proliferation Acts

(Washington, D.C.): The fix is clearly
in with respect to U.S.-Chinese nuclear
cooperation. To be sure, Clinton
Administration officials continue to
insist to publications like the Washington
Times that “We’re still working
on the issues…We have not reached
agreement on a resolution of all the
outstanding issues” and
“Obviously both sides would like to
be in a position to announce that we’re
proceeding with the Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement at the Summit, but we’re
not yet finished.” (Emphasis
added.) The truth, however, is that the
decision was taken long ago to make the
centerpiece of the Sino-American summit
later this month an announcement that
U.S. nuclear power technology could begin
to flow to China.⁽¹⁾

Before that can happen though,
President Clinton is obliged by statute
to certify that China is abiding by
previous commitments not to assist other
nations with nuclear facilities not
covered by International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards. He must also formally
express satisfaction with Chinese
commitments not to transfer nuclear
weapons-related technology to non-nuclear
weapons states and to create and
implement effective export control
arrangements needed to ensure that such
transfers do not occur outside
non-governmental channels.

‘Engage’ Away

The Clinton Administration’s party
line — and that of others with an
interest in having the U.S. nuclear power
industry make sales to Communist China —
is that Beijing has made “real
progress” on all these scores. For
example, a recent report by a study group
sponsored by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and chaired by
former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft (who infamously endeared
himself to the Chinese by clandestinely
visiting and toasting Li Peng immediately
after his brutal crackdown in Tiananmen
Square) concluded:

“Since 1990, China has
continued, at times unsteadily,
to improve its non-proliferation
record. In 1992, China acceded to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, whose extension China
later supported in 1995. In 1994,
China strengthened its commitment
to observe the Missile Technology
Control Regime guidelines, and
worked closely with the United
States in halting North Korea’s
dangerous nuclear program under
international monitoring. In
1996, China pledged to refrain
from further assistance to
Pakistan’s unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities, adopted a nuclear
testing moratorium, signed the
comprehensive nuclear test ban
and ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention.

“At about the same time,
concerns about certain continuing
Chinese exports persisted, and
there have been setbacks. The
provision of nuclear technology
to Pakistan is perhaps the most
worrisome, but Chinese
cooperation with Iran also
presents a serious problem. The
best way to handle these concerns,
however, is to address them in
the context of a broader
relationship in which China sees
some advantage to responding to
American concerns, rather than
defying these concerns as a
matter of national pride.”⁽²⁾
(Emphasis added.)

On 24 September 1997, the Administration
garnered an additional bit of political
cover for its dissembling about China’s
proliferation behavior from a letter to
President Clinton signed by Senators Frank
H. Murkowski (R-AK) and Max
S. Baucus (D-MT). It declared,
in part:

“We…understand that
significant progress has been
made in [the area of
non-proliferation]. China has
agreed to terminate certain
international activities which
the U.S. found objectionable.
China has also agreed to
promulgate a clear and
comprehensive export control
regime for nuclear equipment,
services and technology….We
encourage you to build upon the
progress which your
administration has made in the
civilian nuclear area by sending
to Congress the necessary
certifications which will enable
you to implement the 1985
U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation.”

Nettlesome Facts

Unfortunately,
to claim that real progress is being made
by China on proliferation — and that
further progress can be assured if it is
rewarded — is to ignore the totality of
the facts available. As the Center for
Security Policy’s director, Frank
J. Gaffney, Jr., noted in an
article entitled “China Arms the
Rogues,” in the September 1997
edition of the Middle East Quarterly:
“The picture that emerges [from
a review of the available evidence] is
one of an outside state systematically
seeding the Middle East with weapons of
mass destruction, along with the systems
needed to deliver them over increasingly
long ranges.”

Sensible Members of Congress and other
leading figures have come to recognize
the worthlessness of Chinese
“assurances.” For example, last
June, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Benjamin
Gilman (R-NY) observed: “Fighting
proliferation isn’t about getting
meaningless pledges from governments that
don’t have a good track record of
adhering to earlier pledges⁽³⁾….Fighting
proliferation isn’t about ignoring
overwhelming evidence of illegal
transfers.”

Such sentiments were recently echoed
at a Senate Foreign Relations hearing by Paul
Wolfowitz, who formerly served
successive administrations in senior
State and Defense Department posts and
currently is the Dean of John Hopkins
School for Advanced International
Studies. On 8 October 1997, Amb.
Wolfowitz testified:

“Whatever the motivations,
it seems clear that [Chinese]
behavior will not change simply
through friendly persuasion.
If they think they can continue
such behavior at no cost in their
dealings with us, it will go on.
It must be made clear that doing
business with our enemies will
cost them if they want to do
business with us…. [We]
should not be afraid of invoking
specific sanctions, or
withholding specific cooperation
that is sought from us, on the
grounds that any step will
endanger the overall relationship
with either Russia or China if
they believe that we need such
relations more than they do. But
that is the message that is sent
if we lean over backwards to
interpret away disturbing
intelligence information or to
ignore the clear intent of U.S.
laws.”

Fig Leaves

Such is the determination of the Clinton
Administration to “engage” with
China — and to seek short-term profits
for U.S. companies irrespective of
the strategic consequences of doing so
— that it is ignoring the foregoing,
prudent counsel. Despite China’s
appalling record of persistent
proliferation and repeated broken
promises, the Clinton Administration is
evidently seeking still more
“assurances” from Beijing
including, according to press reports,
the following “conditions”:

• Pledges that the PRC will adhere
  to the tenets of the Nuclear
  Suppliers Group, if not join it
  (something China has repeatedly
  refused to do in the past);
• Promises to restrict sales of
  nuclear equipment to facilities
  not subject to international
  inspection;
• Assurances that China will end
  exports of missile technology and
  assistance in the development of
  and training on such missiles;
• Commitments to establish an
  export control regime to curb
  non-governmental and governmental
  exports alike.

It is absolutely predictable that
such pledges — if, they are, in fact,
made by the Chinese — will be broken
before long. No U.S. foreign policy
worthy of the name can be predicated upon
such weak reeds.

The Bottom Line

A more realistic view of China’s
proliferation practices — and more
strategic prescription for a U.S. policy
to address such practices — is offered
by Mr. Gaffney in the conclusion of his Middle
East Quarterly article:

“For the People’s Republic
of China, these transactions may
be more than simply a valuable
means of generating hard
currency, paying for oil imports,
and gaining influence. Beijing
also appears to be encouraging
weapons proliferation in the
Middle East as part of its
campaign to diminish America’s
presence and influence in Asia.
For violent conflict in the
Middle East would preoccupy the
United States, sapping its
resources and tying it down far
from Chinese borders.

“That the PRC’s
proliferation activities appear
to be part of a larger and more
ominous pattern of hostile
behavior adds to the urgency of
effective countermeasures. The
United States must take the lead
in forging efforts —
multilateral where possible,
unilateral where necessary — to
resist and curb these
perils.”

The United States should not
implement a nuclear cooperation agreement
under present circumstances —
particularly if the price of doing so is
not only to sell Beijing technology that
may come back to haunt us, but to lie
about present and prospective Chinese
proliferation activities that certainly
will do so.

– 30 –

1. See the Casey
Institute’s Perspective
entitled Lying For Dollars:
Expected Clinton Certification on P.R.C.
Proliferation Would Demean U.S., Disserve
Its Interests ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-C_140″>No. 97-C 140, 18
September 1997).

2. U.S.-China
Commercial Nuclear Cooperation,
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Sept. 1997.

3. See the
Center’s Decision Brief
entitled ‘There You Go
Again’: More Chinese Proliferation, More
Clinton Politicization of Intelligence
(No. 96-D
56, 12 June 1996).