U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

•     Secretary of Defense Gates (October 2008):  “No weapons in our arsenal have been tested since 1992.  So the information on which we base our annual certification of stockpile grows increasingly dated and incomplete.”⁸⁹

“At a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium. It also makes it harder to reduce existing stockpiles, because eventually we won’t have as much confidence in the efficacy of the weapons we do have.”⁹⁰

•     Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Anastasio (April 2008):  “The continuing accumulation of small changes from stockpile fixes, life extension activities, and aging with combined effects that are difficult to quantify will result in larger performance uncertainties and pose increasing risk to the certification of low-margin legacy warheads.”⁹¹

“In 1995, the United States embarked on an ambitious effort to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, an effort for which we could not guarantee success. Many felt that maintenance of adequate confidence in the stockpile required following the scientific method with the ability to continue at least partial yield nuclear tests to address the inevitable issues that would arise.”⁹²

“At a time when our uncertainties are increasing, we should have a more vigorous program of nonnuclear, above-ground testing development and use, capabilities that allow us to validate and augment our developing predictive simulation tools. Regrettably, we are moving in the opposite direction.”⁹³

By implication at least, the unease evident in these comments about the present state of affairs produced by a seventeen-year long  voluntary testing moratorium suggests that a permanent ban on such testing would be fatal for the U.S. deterrent.

President Obama has, nonetheless, announced his intention to secure the U.S. Senate’s approval of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that would permanently preclude the United States from conducting all such tests.  Were the Senate to reverse the vote taken a decade ago by which an actual majority of Senators voted 51-48 to reject the CTBT and agree to its ratification, the costs would be immense and the benefits illusory.

Some of the reasons for continuing to reject U.S. ratification of the CTBT are:

•     The CTBT is fatally imprecise.  Notably, it does not define what constitutes a nuclear test.  As a result, for example, the Russians appear to be continuing to conduct underground low-yield tests and hydronuclear experiments – something successive American administrations have considered impermissible under the Treaty and declined to do.

•     The CTBT’s ban on testing is absolutely unverifiable.  Simple decoupling, which can be practiced in all types of geology, can render a 20-kiloton underground nuclear test unidentifiable by global seismic networks.

•     At some point, the deteriorating condition of our stockpile will require testing to ensure its continued viability.

•     CTBT Ratification would dangerously delay, if not effectively preclude, modernization of our stockpile.

•     Ratification would carry a huge penalty for the United States:  By the treaty’s own terms it cannot enter into force until North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India, Israel, China, Indonesia, and Egypt ratify it.  If the U.S. ratifies, one of these states – possibly two – might eventually be induced to ratify; but the others, never.  However the U.S., having ratified would, by international law, be permanently precluded from testing by a not-in-force treaty.

•     For centuries, scientific advances by mankind have been the result of employing the “scientific method,” of which testing is the central element.  For generations to come, America must depend upon its nuclear technology being superior to that of the rest of the world – this cannot be achieved if the CTBT is ratified.  In the critical field of nuclear weapons, our scientists must not be denied use of the scientific method.