U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

 B. Reject Ratification of the  Comprehensive

Nuclear  Test Ban Treaty

No less important to maintaining the American nuclear deterrent is preserving our ability to test our nuclear weapons in order to ensure their future safety and viability, a matter of simple common sense.  Failure to do so would nullify the effect of other efforts made to ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  To that end, the United States should not ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

As noted above, testing of nuclear weapons is a critical component of any successful U.S. weapons modernization program.  Such testing is critical not only to assess the effectiveness of the weapons themselves, but also to assess the survivability of American weapons systems – conventional and nuclear – against a wide range of nuclear weapons effects.¹⁰¹ Ratification of the CTBT would prevent the United States from engaging in this vital exercise, while doing nothing to prevent peer competitors and rogue nations from developing, testing, proliferating and perhaps using nuclear weapons.

C.  Maintain the Readiness of 

U.S. Deterrent Forces

The credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal requires that it be perceived by those we seek to deter as useable.  For this reason it has historically been maintained at a ready status, although subject to myriad controls and safeguards to preclude any possible accidental or unauthorized use.

As the Strategic Posture Commission notes in its final report of May, 2009:

“Some in the arms control community have pressed enthusiastically for new types of agreements that take U.S. and Russian forces off of so-called ‘hair trigger’ alert.   This is simply an erroneous characterization of the issue.  The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly stable.  They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decision-making.”¹⁰² (emphasis added)

STRATCOM Commander General Chilton described the situation as follows in January, 2009, responding to President Obama’s use of the term “hair-trigger”:

“It conjures a drawn weapon in the hands of somebody…And their finger is on the trigger. And you’re worried they might sneeze, because it is so sensitive….[The]reality of our alert posture today [is that] the weapon is in the holster…[the holster] has two combination locks on it, [it] takes two people to open those locks, [and] they can’t do it without authenticated orders from the president of the United States.”¹⁰³

D.  Address Large and Growing Asymmetries in

Tactical/Theater Nuclear Weapons

Much of the U.S. focus leading up to the expiration of the START treaty has been on strategic nuclear weapons, defined by the Department of Defense as nuclear weapons designed to have a longer-range impact on enemy military forces.¹⁰⁴ It is imperative, however, that any U.S. negotiating effort address as well “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons – also known as tactical or theater weapons, many of which are more powerful than those that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  These are characterized by the Department of Defense as nuclear weapons designed to contribute to the accomplishment of a military mission of limited scope.¹⁰⁵

There have long been concerns about Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons.  As nuclear strategy analyst Dr. Mark Schneider has written:

“In 1991 and 1992 Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin, respectively, pledged to reduce Russian tactical nuclear weapons in a number of specified ways.  There has long been a concern in the West that Russia was not acting consistently with these commitments, the socalled Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) …. Russia has rejected any arms control measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons, except for the removal of U.S. weapons from Europe.”¹⁰⁶

The  Strategic Posture Commission repeatedly affirms in its Final Report the abiding need to address tactical nuclear weapons:

•     “Some U.S. allies located closer to Russia…are fearful of Russia and its tactical nuclear forces.  The imbalance in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as reductions in strategic weapons proceed.”¹⁰⁷

•     “As part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces, Russia’s military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF, particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the battlefield).^”108

•     “Senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads with a large additional number in reserve.  Some Russian military experts have written about use of very low yield nuclear ‘scalpels’ to defeat NATO forces.  The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems…open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.”¹⁰⁹

•     “Like China, Russia has not shown transparency that its neighbors and the United States desire on such matters.  It has repeatedly rebuffed U.S. proposals for NSNF transparency measures and NATO’s requests for information.  And it is no longer in compliance with its PNI commitments.”¹¹⁰