U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting it Right

 II. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The United States has led the world over the past century, and has done so through strength – economic, military, cultural, and moral.

Nuclear weapons have helped keep this country safe for decades, and must continue to do so.  We have relied on them to deter not only nuclear attack, but also attacks using weapons of mass destruction such as biological or chemical weapons.

Nuclear weapons have lessened the occurrence of major conventional warfare and the number of casualties in major conventional warfare.

To be credible, U.S. nuclear weapons have to be reliably tested, modernized and updated to becapable of viably addressing future threats.  This requires that they have low yield, reduced collateral damage, greatly enhanced security, and specialized effects, such as earth penetration.

Our nuclear arsenal has helped nonproliferation by dissuading other states from seeking to go nuclear. A strong U.S. nuclear deterrent puts a downward pressure on nuclear proliferation. To date, we have had considerable success in dissuading both non-nuclear allies covered by our nuclear umbrella and adversaries from “going nuclear.”

There is no evidence that a reduction in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons or in U.S. investment in its nuclear deterrent – to say nothing of the complete elimination of America’s strategic forces – would translate into a downward effect on other nations’ nuclear stockpiles or ambitions. In fact, as we have made cuts, others have acquired, or accelerated their efforts to acquire, nuclear weapons.

For more than a decade and a half, we have been effectively unilaterally “freezing” our deterrent – failing to modernize our arsenal, eliminating production capabilities, refraining from necessary nuclear testing, and gutting the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

It is essential to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent that the weapons that comprise it remain safe, reliable and effective. They are not on “hair-trigger” status, but they must be ready for controlled, prompt use to have deterrent value.

Maintaining a deterrent of sufficient size, readiness, quality and credibility is essential to dissuade proliferation. Doing otherwise would expose the American people to heightened danger as: enemies are emboldened; allies are demoralized and alienated; and proliferation intensifies.

“Loose nukes”  are a threat, but those most threatening are Russian and Pakistani nuclear weapons, not American.

There is no arms control regime that can be created to verify with high confidence the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

There is a long record of Soviet/Russian cheating on arms control obligations.  This is going on today with the testing – and soon, the deployment – of the Kremlin’s multiple-warheadconfigured (MIRVed) SS-27.  While President Obama in Prague called for a policy of strict verification and compliance, in practice his administration is doing nothing about outstanding Russian violations of the START treaty.  For example, the treaty prohibits increasing the number of warheads on missiles, and the SS-27 is declared as a single warhead missile.