Shariah’s Black Box

[241] 212U.S. at 494.

[242] Bharara, supra note 240, at 62-63.

[243] W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 499-508 (5th ed. 1984). For a general discussion on corporate liability, see Note, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1227, 1247-51 (1979).

[244] See infra notes 359-361 and accompanying text.

[245] See infra notes 362-364 and accompanying text.

[246] In his essay on the proper role of a Shariah authority for a mutual fund, DeLorenzo argues that beyond the “quantitative” rules, there are “socially responsible” screens that must be applied over the purely objective ones. DeLorenzo, supra note 22, at 6. For a discussion of the purpose of the DJII Shariah advisory board, see infra Part III.B.1.

[247] See infra notes 286-291 and accompanying text.

[248] See Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81 (2006) (discussing “collective knowledge”).

[249] It seems Shariah authorities themselves understand the reputational and even financial risks of not imposing some broad standards for entry into the elite group of Shariah authorities and for not standardizing what is Shariah-compliant and what is not. See, e.g., IFSB Standards, supra note 154.

[250] See infra notes 358-363 and accompanying text.