Shariah’s Black Box

[181] 485U.S. 224, 445 (1988) (emphasis in the original).

[182] Id. at 449 (quoting from 478 F. 2d at 1302).

[183] Id.  at 445-449 (footnotes and citations omitted).

[184] Id.

[185] Id. at 238-239.

[186] A related question would be who decides and how does one decide what Shariah is? This is not specific to the query of materiality. As noted supra, if a financial institution relies upon specific Shariah authorities, the question might be as simple as determining what these specific Shariah authorities consider to be authentic and authoritative Shariah rulings on Jihad, terrorism, and violence against non-Muslims and non-Shariah-compliant Muslims. Aside from a careful examination of the rulings on these subjects issued by the relevant Shariah authorities, a problem in any event if they have not published rulings in these areas, one would be well-advised to look to the classical Shariah authorities upon which these contemporary Shariah authorities rely as authoritative in their SCF rulings. While such a reliance might not be dispositive (i.e., a Shariah authority might rely on Ibn Taymiyyah for purposes of determining what kind of nominate contract Shariah allows for any given transaction, but in fact reject Ibn Taymiyyah’s rulings on Jihad and war against the infidels). But at the very least, it raises an important fact question for the reasonable investor that might very well rise to the level of materiality: Do the Shariah authorities of the particular financial institution consider Ibn Taymiyyah’s Shariah-based rulings on war against non-Muslims and non-Shariah compliant Muslims authoritative? If not Ibn Taymiyyah’s, whose?

[187] This is procedurally akin to a defendant’s position on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Assuming all the allegations are true, as a matter of law, there is no actual evidence that Shariah is the cause of violence rather than its excuse.

[188] 426U.S. 438, 450 (1976).

[189] See supra note 93; supra notes 290-291 and accompanying text..

[190] See generally Loss & Seligman, supra note 10, at 171-174. For a thorough discussion of the quantitative-qualitative distinction in disclosure, see John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, And Demise Of An Unworkable Standard, 48 Cath. U.L. Rev. 41 (1998).